From the prism of pragmatism, to be reasonable today is to understand that asserting beliefs comes with epistemic responsibilities that are increasingly urgent – as an interconnected world heightens the moral cost of credulity. Moderation, restraint and intellectual modesty are important features of the virtue of reasonableness as Rawls rightly perceived, but they don’t exhaust it. Taken too far, they can actually undermine our epistemic alertness, as we instinctively recoil from contentious, yet necessary, exchanges of views. Instead, the pressing need to engage in logical argumentation and to offer reasons to support our commitments should regain their centrality as the hallmarks of what it means to be reasonable.
Putting it all together, a reasonable, hyper-responsible citizen is one who above all is aware that, in a digitally interconnected society, we all have the moral obligation to believe only what we have diligently investigated. Irresponsible practices of belief-formation are the deepest sin of a digital society since the stakes of credulity are simply too high.
The author's conclusion is that the average citizen should realize that: however, he seems to be focusing solely on the harms done from belief, ignoring those that come from belief's opposite:...
The author's conclusion is that the average citizen should realize that:
beliefs shape her practices and, since her practices can affect others, she has a moral responsibility not to put them at risk with her credulity;
even if a belief seems too immaterial to put anyone at risk, accepting it uncritically weakens her epistemic alertness and can, in time, turn her into a careless, credulous believer who puts others at risk; and
in her capacity as communicator of belief, she has the moral responsibility not to pollute the well of collective knowledge and instead to strive to sustain its integrity.
however, he seems to be focusing solely on the harms done from belief, ignoring those that come from belief's opposite: doubt. (I take disbelief to be another form of belief, specifically that if you disbelieve x, then you believe not-x.)
If "our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions" and are thus morally salient, it follows that lacking a belief will have the inverse effect on our desires and actions, and is thus just as morally important.
For instance, real political harm is being done by those people who currently say such things as, "I'm not sure who won the presidential election. There were a lot of fishy things that happened and we should really get to the bottom of it all before we just blindly accept the results." Even if they haven't formed the (harmful) belief that Trump secretly won the election, their skepticism about it bears moral weight. Skepticism does not compel the desires and actions that would come about from the belief that Biden fairly won the 2020 election. Instead, it enables the liars and cheats to further subvert the political process.
Since all three of the author's statements above seem to apply equally to doubt as they do to belief, it's not at all clear to me that "[i]rresponsible practices of belief-formation are the deepest sin of a digital society since the stakes of credulity are simply too high." I don't know how the author would respond to this challenge.
From the article:
The author's conclusion is that the average citizen should realize that:
however, he seems to be focusing solely on the harms done from belief, ignoring those that come from belief's opposite: doubt. (I take disbelief to be another form of belief, specifically that if you disbelieve x, then you believe not-x.)
If "our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions" and are thus morally salient, it follows that lacking a belief will have the inverse effect on our desires and actions, and is thus just as morally important.
For instance, real political harm is being done by those people who currently say such things as, "I'm not sure who won the presidential election. There were a lot of fishy things that happened and we should really get to the bottom of it all before we just blindly accept the results." Even if they haven't formed the (harmful) belief that Trump secretly won the election, their skepticism about it bears moral weight. Skepticism does not compel the desires and actions that would come about from the belief that Biden fairly won the 2020 election. Instead, it enables the liars and cheats to further subvert the political process.
Since all three of the author's statements above seem to apply equally to doubt as they do to belief, it's not at all clear to me that "[i]rresponsible practices of belief-formation are the deepest sin of a digital society since the stakes of credulity are simply too high." I don't know how the author would respond to this challenge.