13 votes

Topic deleted by author

19 comments

  1. [13]
    nacho
    Link
    The question is whether it's reasonable for Russia to feel threatened. (spoiler: It's not, so this article gets it all wrong: Self-determination is a thing.) In my view it's obvious that any...
    • Exemplary

    The question is whether it's reasonable for Russia to feel threatened. (spoiler: It's not, so this article gets it all wrong: Self-determination is a thing.)


    In my view it's obvious that any country has the right to determine that they don't want to be under the thumb of a large power. There have been no realistic overtures of further NATO expansion eastwards; The countries on the eastern border of today's NATO don't satisfy requirements to join, and don't seem like they could gain entry for a long time (Finland and Sweden excluded).


    To put this in backyard terms: If my neighbor wishes to plant Birch trees that I don't like, that I feel threatened by, that's still his property no matter how much I don't like it. Especially if that neighbor goes for Birch trees from that other neighbor I hate, rather than buying my lovely shrubs instead.


    The responsibility for this war is not with NATO. Blaming NATO implicitly asserts that small countries have no right to self-determination, and that larger powers have rights and responsibilities that overrule sovereignty. This is China's playbook in its neighborhood too.

    I can't just say that I feel threatened by your country asserting its actual defense, and then demand that you stop building an effective defense of your own country because I feel threatened. Accepting such an argument creates a position where the status quo gives the right to eternally bully neighbors.


    In my view, there are two huge logs fueling this fire. The first log was the ill-considered decision by the U.S. in the 1990s to expand NATO after — indeed, despite — the collapse of the Soviet Union.

    This first log puts the situation on its head: The whole idea behind NATO expansion eastwards was to stabilize ex-soviet republics: NATO guarantees that these republics can disarm based on collective defense guarantees so they can rebuild society instead of spending on military.

    Clearly, this has been a tremendous success for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They are no longer under Russia's thumb. They have real independence to do what they want as free peoples in democratic countries.


    The second and far bigger log is how Putin cynically exploited NATO’s expansion closer to Russia’s borders to rally Russians to his side to cover for his huge failure of leadership. Putin has utterly failed to build Russia into an economic model that would actually attract its neighbors, not repel them, and inspire its most talented people to want to stay, not get in line for visas to the West.

    This is the only log.

    Ukraine now sorely regrets that it disassembled its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s, while not getting formal defensive alliances to guarantee its borders. Had Ukraine still had nukes, they would still be a free and independent country and not under invasion.


    The rest of the article is quite simply a series of variations of appeasement: It's absurd that countries should be forbidden from joining NATO because they border Russia.

    Let's look at a counterfactual: Say Finland, Ukraine and Belarus became members of NATO. Russian aggression into Europe would be impossible as their western borders would not be ones they could ignore and invade.

    In this counterfactual situation, Russia would have to look at itself to solve its issues rather than looking at Europe. (expansion and diffuse claims that amount to Hitleresque "Lebensraum" into Central Asia wouldn't work the same way).

    The disintegration of the Russian state is not NATO's fault. It's about the kleptocracy that Putin is the foremost exponent of, as the largest grifter in human history, and the world's richest person by far. The responsibility lies clearly there. None of it lies with NATO.

    37 votes
    1. [2]
      Cycloneblaze
      Link Parent
      Have to object to this part. Ukraine extracted all the concessions (in the form of financial aid and so on) that it reasonably could in exchange for its nukes at the time, considering that the...

      Ukraine now sorely regrets that it disassembled its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s, while not getting formal defensive alliances to guarantee its borders. Had Ukraine still had nukes, they would still be a free and independent country and not under invasion.

      Have to object to this part. Ukraine extracted all the concessions (in the form of financial aid and so on) that it reasonably could in exchange for its nukes at the time, considering that the entire Western world was breathing down its neck, telling it not to keep them (to say nothing of the Russian Federation). What's more, while it had the nukes it didn't have the logistical or military infrastructure to keep, maintain and fire them on its own; also, most of them were long-range nukes suitable for the USSR to strike the USA, not Ukraine to strike its neighbour. Trying to keep the nukes would have been a very expensive and wasteful white whale, and would have cost them all the support that they did get, so it seems a stretch to say they regret not doing that.


      To your wider point, I agree that NATO can't be held responsible for this conflict, but not that the article is ridiculous. My takeaway was that the expansion of NATO gave Putin a low-hanging fruit to agitate around when he felt that military antagonism was his best option. Would he have found something else to object to, had NATO not been (supposedly) encroaching on his borders? Maybe. But it might have been much harder for him to sell, internally at least.

      The question posed is whether that rhetorical gift to Putin was worth the expansion of NATO - specifically worth it to America, because this piece is certainly US-focused. I think that's a valid question, from that focus.

      But I also think (and you make this point too) it ignores that those countries then, and countries like Sweden, Finland and Ukraine now, make their own decisions on whether a mutual-defence alliance is the right move for them. It's not a matter of them being American puppets as Putin would like, so it's ridiculous to demand that NATO not accept Ukraine as a member when that is ultimately the choice of Ukraine.

      Although, I was interested to learn that Ukraine has requested NATO membership for a long time and it's largely been NATO's side that has ignored it (precisely, you would think, for the risk of this invasion). Maybe this is a problem of Putin's own invention after all.

      9 votes
      1. vektor
        Link Parent
        I disagree. With how flimsy and detached from reality his justification is right now, a different status quo would not have affected his capacity to manufacture some casus belli. He manufactured...

        To your wider point, I agree that NATO can't be held responsible for this conflict, but not that the article is ridiculous. My takeaway was that the expansion of NATO gave Putin a low-hanging fruit to agitate around when he felt that military antagonism was his best option. Would he have found something else to object to, had NATO not been (supposedly) encroaching on his borders? Maybe. But it might have been much harder for him to sell, internally at least.

        I disagree. With how flimsy and detached from reality his justification is right now, a different status quo would not have affected his capacity to manufacture some casus belli. He manufactured pretty much out of thin air, I don't think he's at all reliant on the exact composition of said air.

        16 votes
    2. [5]
      Leonidas
      (edited )
      Link Parent
      I don't mean to sound rude or dismissive here, but really all this talk of "rights" just makes me ask: so what? Rights are only real to the degree that they are enforced, and international...

      In my view it's obvious that any country has the right to determine that they don't want to be under the thumb of a large power.

      Blaming NATO implicitly asserts that small countries have no right to self-determination, and that larger powers have rights and responsibilities that overrule sovereignty.

      I don't mean to sound rude or dismissive here, but really all this talk of "rights" just makes me ask: so what? Rights are only real to the degree that they are enforced, and international relations is one of the areas where this is most obvious. "Self-determination" was ultimately an excuse for the Entente to dismember Austria-Hungary, no matter how piously Wilson may have opined about it. They never applied the same standard to their own empires, so attempting to call them out for hypocrisy rather than analyzing their actions through a lens of realpolitik is a waste of time. In the modern day, it's a historical fact that the US did renege on its agreement to not expand NATO eastward and that this has provided Putin the pretense to wheel out the tanks on the basis that his invasion is somehow a defensive response to encroachment. There is no higher authority to appeal to here, as much as we'd all like there to be one. The closest thing is the atom, which hasn't been the US' sole domain since 1949.

      I can't just say that I feel threatened by your country asserting its actual defense, and then demand that you stop building an effective defense of your own country because I feel threatened. Accepting such an argument creates a position where the status quo gives the right to eternally bully neighbors.

      I mean, does the Monroe Doctrine ring any bells? The Cuban Missile Crisis? This is how it's always been, and I wish I had any idea of how to escape this destructive paradigm. The biggest lesson to the West from all this this is that when the other side holds all the nuclear-tipped cards, it's better to negotiate based on reality and make concessions where necessary than to talk a big game about "democracy and freedom" that can never be realistically defended. Dangling NATO membership in front of Ukraine and giving them false confidence was a big mistake. Either give it to them and be prepared to commit or don't act shocked when stuff like this happens.

      8 votes
      1. [4]
        skybrian
        Link Parent
        You're saying a mistake was made, meaning that there was some better alternative that wasn't taken. What does that look like? What should people in Ukraine have done instead if they didn't have...

        You're saying a mistake was made, meaning that there was some better alternative that wasn't taken. What does that look like? What should people in Ukraine have done instead if they didn't have "false confidence" about getting into NATO?

        Also, I'm wondering which people had "false confidence?" I'm not familiar enough with Ukrainian politics to say, but perhaps, some people were cynical about their chances the whole time?

        6 votes
        1. [3]
          Leonidas
          (edited )
          Link Parent
          The most significant issue I'm aware of is the repeated violations of the Minsk agreements, which were made in 2014-15 in an attempt to stop the fighting in Donbas. While the goal was to...

          The most significant issue I'm aware of is the repeated violations of the Minsk agreements, which were made in 2014-15 in an attempt to stop the fighting in Donbas. While the goal was to demilitarize the region and give the separatists autonomy within Ukraine, the ceasefire was barely even given a second glance before the fighting continued. One might argue that Ukraine would never have shelled Donetsk and Lugansk with Western acquiescence if not for Russia continuing to arm the separatists in the first place, or vice versa, that there would be no attempt at breaking away whatsoever if not for the lack of autonomy given to those provinces. Either way, it's clear that the Minsk agreements were the best chance to avoid the feedback loop of strikes and counter-strikes that eventually led to this moment. Sadly, this choice was not in the hands of the ordinary Ukrainians who are suffering the most from this war.

          3 votes
          1. [2]
            skybrian
            Link Parent
            I have no independent knowledge here, but this analysis from acoup.blog seems relevant:

            I have no independent knowledge here, but this analysis from acoup.blog seems relevant:

            The other such pretext was Ukraine’s supposed failure to hew to the precise conditions of the Minsk Protocols, two ceasefire agreements negotiated in 2014 and 2015 which were ostensibly to stop the fighting in the Donbas. The Russian-backed separatists there have not honored any ceasefire so negotiated, despite the fact that, as formulated the Minsk Protocols are extremely favorable to them (because they were negotiated with Ukraine under the threat of an ongoing direct and quite illegal Russian intervention). It is also the case that Ukrainian implementation of some of the provisions of the Minsk Protocols has been uneven (but not entirely absent). However, late in this crisis Ukraine indicated that it was willing to go back to the Minsk Protocols; Russia responded by recognizing the ‘independence’ of Donetsk and Luhansk in a blatant violation of the agreement before invading. Once again, if the Russian concern was legitimately Donetsk and Luhansk, an invasion of the rest of Ukraine would be fairly obviously unnecessary and indeed counter-productive. It is thus now quite obvious that Putin had no intention of keeping to Minsk during this crisis, if he ever did.

            3 votes
            1. Leonidas
              Link Parent
              There are a lot of good points here. Since Kiev had previously stated outright that they wouldn't observe the Minsk agreements and kept shelling the separatist regions, I don't know that you can...

              There are a lot of good points here. Since Kiev had previously stated outright that they wouldn't observe the Minsk agreements and kept shelling the separatist regions, I don't know that you can put the blame solely on either side for failing to observe the ceasefire. For all Russia may have had pretenses of being the honest broker between Ukraine and the separatists, anyone could see they had vested interests in the region. I don't know what would have been acceptable to all parties short of direct UN involvement as an observer and peacekeeping force. Nobody wants to be the first person to put down their gun without some kind of assurance of reciprocity, which is (IMO) why the agreements were extremely optimistic. At any rate, I'm not a military expert so I can't speak to the specifics in this case.

              However, military action is one thing, political action is a different beast entirely. To be more specific, the Minsk agreements required acknowledgement of the particularities of Donestsk and Luhansk, namely acceptance of their self-government, withdrawal of paramilitaries from those territories, and a program of economic recovery implemented for the region. The government of Ukraine ended up doing the opposite, and the last eight years have been marked by constant shelling, harassment, and ethnic persecution against these regions. You might argue that doing so is an attempt to avoid the same "capitulation" which led to the Maidan uprisings in 2014 and started this conflict in the first place, and obviously Russia isn't acting on principle here, but treating the separatists like nothing more than Russian puppets appears to have created a self-fulfilling prophecy.

              2 votes
    3. [4]
      streblo
      Link Parent
      Minor nitpick: those were Soviet weapons and at no time were the launch codes held by Ukraine. See: https://twitter.com/nukestrat/status/1495925696056766467?s=21.

      Ukraine now sorely regrets that it disassembled its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s, while not getting formal defensive alliances to guarantee its borders. Had Ukraine still had nukes, they would still be a free and independent country and not under invasion.

      Minor nitpick: those were Soviet weapons and at no time were the launch codes held by Ukraine. See: https://twitter.com/nukestrat/status/1495925696056766467?s=21.

      6 votes
      1. [4]
        Comment deleted by author
        Link Parent
        1. [3]
          streblo
          Link Parent
          Russia wanted the (non-operational) missiles back. You can't use them as leverage or as a deterrent, your choices in that scenario are get what concessions you can by returning them or fight a war...

          Russia wanted the (non-operational) missiles back. You can't use them as leverage or as a deterrent, your choices in that scenario are get what concessions you can by returning them or fight a war over them in hopes you can reverse-engineer access one day. I think it's highly unlikely Russia would wait for an independent Ukraine to get nuclear missiles operational several hundred kilometers from Moscow.

          2 votes
          1. [3]
            Comment deleted by author
            Link Parent
            1. AugustusFerdinand
              Link Parent
              Everything I've read stated it'd take a 90's Ukraine about 12-18 months to make them operational under their command and that a just-came-out-of-soviet-collapse-Russia would have invaded...

              The implication to me with the point about the launch codes is that it means the nukes would've always been non-operational. If that's not the case, then I don't see the point in bringing it up.

              Everything I've read stated it'd take a 90's Ukraine about 12-18 months to make them operational under their command and that a just-came-out-of-soviet-collapse-Russia would have invaded immediately. I don't believe the second part, but that's what hand gesturing vaguely they say.

              2 votes
            2. streblo
              Link Parent
              It was certainly possible, I just think the feasibility of that choice is over-stated. Looking at likely and potential outcomes for ahistorical choices is part and parcel of examining if something...

              It can still be quite valid then to regret giving up the nukes if making them operational was theoretically possible.

              It was certainly possible, I just think the feasibility of that choice is over-stated. Looking at likely and potential outcomes for ahistorical choices is part and parcel of examining if something was or wasn't a mistake.

              1 vote
    4. AugustusFerdinand
      Link Parent
      Yeap. There's the argument that Ukraine would be in a worse position if they'd kept the arsenal with a bunch strawman reasons about why (mostly assuming that Ukraine would never be able to use...

      Ukraine now sorely regrets that it disassembled its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s, while not getting formal defensive alliances to guarantee its borders. Had Ukraine still had nukes, they would still be a free and independent country and not under invasion.

      Yeap.

      There's the argument that Ukraine would be in a worse position if they'd kept the arsenal with a bunch strawman reasons about why (mostly assuming that Ukraine would never be able to use them effectively or that a recent-collapse-of-the-Soviet-Union-Russia would invade Ukraine before they could figure out how to use them), but I don't buy most of them and the only deterrent to a nuclear power when there is a lack of strong treaties with nuclear powers is having your own nukes. See Libya vs North Korea for an example. Libya disarmed for monetary reward and expected pressures to disarm Israel (never going to happen) and received a forced regime change. North Korea undoubtedly should have had such a regime change/reunification by now, but anyone wanna guess what color the button is that prevents such?

      Russia agreed to leave Ukraine alone because they disarmed, but agreements are only kept when there's a way to enforce them and Russian waffles between saying their various invasions don't count or that the agreement was "with another government and doesn't count".

      3 votes
  2. [2]
    0d_billie
    Link
    An interesting read, and certainly one that feeds into my biases. I'm certainly no fan of Russia's, but it's absurd to me that NATO didn't realise that continued expansion would have a powerful...

    An interesting read, and certainly one that feeds into my biases. I'm certainly no fan of Russia's, but it's absurd to me that NATO didn't realise that continued expansion would have a powerful impact on Russian policy, and make them feel threatened.

    6 votes
    1. skybrian
      Link Parent
      I'm sure they realized it, but I think this war shows the benefit of NATO, and that countries near Russia were right to join NATO if they could. The Baltic states probably think so, given what...

      I'm sure they realized it, but I think this war shows the benefit of NATO, and that countries near Russia were right to join NATO if they could. The Baltic states probably think so, given what happened.

      I don't know what argument Friedman is trying to make. Is "not entirely innocent" a criticism? Would it be better if they were "innocent?"

      14 votes
  3. [3]
    HotPants
    Link
    Interesting article. It's kind of a chicken and egg problem though. Did NATO expansionism cause Russian expansionism? Did Russian expansionism increase the desire for NATO expansionism? From a...

    Interesting article.

    It's kind of a chicken and egg problem though. Did NATO expansionism cause Russian expansionism? Did Russian expansionism increase the desire for NATO expansionism?

    From a 1996 opinion piece, the risks of NATO expansionism were identified as

    • NATO expansion needlessly provokes Russia.
    • Expansion promotes divisions in an already divided region.
    • Expansion halts the demilitarization of East-Central Europe and costs alliance members a great deal of money.

    This was before NATO 1998 expansion into Latvia, which shares a border with Russia.

    Then, in April 2008, NATO released a statement affirming that Georgia and the Ukraine would be offered membership. US pressure was the chief driver of this decision.

    In 2014, after Russia Annexed Crimea, Stephen Walt proposed that NATO should strike a deal with Ukraine and Russia that enshrined the status of the Ukraine as a non-aligned buffer state. And that striking a similar deal regarding Georgia would also be prudent. Furthermore, NATO should support the incumbent government in Ukraine, whilst at the same time discouraging it from adopting a provocative stance towards Russia.

    Of course, after Crimea, Ukraine wanted closer ties with Nato.

    Without NATO expansionism, would Russia have really left Crimea & Ukraine alone?

    6 votes
    1. [2]
      nacho
      Link Parent
      Let's also not forget the backdrop of the events in 2008, that further underscore your point: In München i 2007 Putin clearly stated his expectations of a "security zone" around Russia. Putin-led...

      Let's also not forget the backdrop of the events in 2008, that further underscore your point:

      • In München i 2007 Putin clearly stated his expectations of a "security zone" around Russia.
      • Putin-led Russia invaded Georgia August 1st 2008.

      Clearly NATO-overtures that Georgia and Ukraine might potentially join NATO in the future if they satisfy a large, complicated process was an attempt to build a path for those countries to safe-guard their autonomy, if they were willing to spend the huge amount of political capital and money it'd take to satisfy NATO's requirements.


      Viewing NATO expansion as the aggressive move turns the matter entirely on its head: A mutual defensive pact can only ever be viewed as an aggressive move if you intend on attacking one of those countries or otherwise plan to infringe or bully them away from their autonomy guaranteed by international law.

      It really is that simple.

      12 votes
      1. HotPants
        Link Parent
        As an aside, this could be about securing natural gas... Maksym Nemchynov, deputy Ukrainian energy minister, said that the country has "high hopes in regards to the Black Sea" as the country seeks...

        As an aside, this could be about securing natural gas...

        Maksym Nemchynov, deputy Ukrainian energy minister, said that the country has "high hopes in regards to the Black Sea" as the country seeks to end gas imports from other countries and looks to produce more gas itself to become self-sufficient within the next 10 years.

        Nemchynov said Ukraine was "looking for collaboration" in order to fully exploit potential deep water gas reserves. The country could "supply the whole region," as "the idea that we will be counting on our own resources purely for our own use was wrong" and the government was seeking to "create a gas hub in Ukraine for the region," he added.

        1 vote