Just got this email from Framework:

Dear Valued Framework Customer,

We are writing to inform you of a data breach at our business intelligence database provider Metabase that resulted in an attacker accessing customer names, email addresses, phone numbers, and addresses. Your information was in the database that was accessed in this breach. This breach did not include order or payment information.

We have full details on the incident below. We are deeply sorry for this breach of information, and are reviewing and improving our methodology for data storage in external database vendors.

We are also in the process of notifying the regulatory authorities in each region where relevant regulations exist. Note that while regulations in most regions do not require notification for breaches of names, email addresses, phone numbers, and addresses, we are sending this email to you regardless to ensure you have visibility and can take any actions needed.

What happened?

On August 6th, 2026 at 9am Pacific Time, Metabase notified us of a breach of their systems with the following email message:

On Monday, August 3, we discovered that Metabase Cloud was attacked by someone utilizing an unknown (“0-day”) security vulnerability in versions 1.58 and above. We immediately blocked the endpoints used for the attack, then quickly identified and patched the vulnerability. We notified law enforcement, and we have engaged with a third party forensics firm to conduct an independent investigation.

Your instance of Metabase was vulnerable to this 0-day. Therefore, to protect your company, we recommend you:

Rotate the credentials for every database connected to your instance; and

Review the admin accounts on your instance and remove anything you don't recognize.

We also discovered that the attacker was able to gain access to your instance. We created a report on the actions we believe the attacker took on your instance, which includes log files, and which you can get from the Metabase Store at [removed url].

(If you do not have access to the Metabase Store, are having issues accessing the report, or do not want to click on a link in an unexpected email, you can log into your instance directly and reach us at Help > Get help in the grid menu in the upper right hand corner. We'll confirm this message is from us and email you the report.)

This report is based on our own application logs. We did not query or read the data in your connected databases.

Depending on the jurisdictions in which you operate and kinds of data your instance connects to, you may have notification obligations under applicable laws. If you have concerns in this regard, we recommend you assess potential notification obligations with your company’s legal or compliance experts.

We regret any inconvenience this incident may cause you, and we are here to support you. If you have questions, please reply to this email or email us at [removed email address], and we'll get back to you as quickly as we can.

Sameer Al-Sakran

Founder and CEO

Metabase

We immediately investigated the logs Metabase provided to us and confirmed that our database instance was accessed by the attacker. We confirmed that the following information was accessed:

• Full name
• Email address
• Login IPs
• Billing and shipping address information
  • Country
  • Address
  • City
  • State
  • Zip code
  • Phone number
  • Company

For Framework for Business customers, we are investigating whether the following information may additionally have been accessed:

• Company
• Phone
• VAT
• EIN
• Billing Email
• No other personally identifiable information, order information, or payment information was accessed.

Note that Metabase has additionally flagged:

Important: This is a preliminary update based on our current knowledge.

We are working with a third-party forensic investigation firm to understand the full nature and scope of the event.

We are providing you this interim update in advance of completing our investigation to allow you to better understand any potential impact and secure your data.

Our investigation is ongoing and the information shared now is preliminary.

Please look at the application logs as well as the queries executed that are provided as separate files in the zip file for detailed activity and a potential timeline.

We’re providing you notice of the breach in the meantime to ensure you have the earliest possible visibility. In the event Metabase notifies us of additional information that impacts you, we will send a follow-up email.

What was done to resolve the issue?

After we were notified of the breach by Metabase, we rotated credentials on all databases associated with our Metabase instance and confirmed that there were no changes in admin access or access to systems outside of Metabase.

What steps have you taken to ensure this doesn’t happen in the future?

We are evaluating the breadth and depth of data shared with business intelligence platforms, and scoping down their access to only the columns required for analysis.

Nirav Patel and the Framework Team

First, let me just say that I'm tech savvy, but I'm self taught for the most part. I never studied cybersecurity or network security. I know the basics, but not the nitty-gritty.

I used to host my own Anytype Server (note taking app) on my raspberry pi. To do this, the documentation says that I need to open two ports, one TCP and another UDP. So that's what I did, and had it set up this way for a while now.

Yesterday though, my raspberry's microSD died. So while I wait for the new one to arrive, I'm taking the chance to review my home network settings.

I closed off a third port that I had for my synology server (for the OpenVPN). I am now using Wireguard (with Tailscale) which doesn't require opening ports. And since my raspberry is offline, I also turned off the other two ports (as of now, I have none opened)

So here's the thing: I remember from my searching that a lot of people are strongly averse to opening ports. Iirc, the basic idea is that if a bad actor knows my home IP and which ports are open, they can enter. So, in theory, a hacker could potentially infiltrate my raspberry pi - and from there potentially wreak havoc in my other devices.

So my questions are:
1- Is it really like that? Could a hacker gain unlimited access to my raspberry via an opened port?
2- If yes, is there something that I can do to strengthen my raspberry pi security?
3- Am I being overly paranoid by worrying about this, even if it’s theoretically possible?

I have changed my email more than once, just as part of customizing my online identity and all that.

and that obviously required me to login into any accounts I had and updating the email associated with them.

the most common workflow I have found is
login -> navigate to settings page -> edit the email field to the new email -> go to the inbox for the new email -> click confirm on confirmation email

then you can go to that website and do the forgot password, provide your email and change the password and get complete control.

I have always found that workflow weird cause it's the most prevalent one I have come across and seems so susceptible to tampering.

if someone leaves their laptop unattended for 3-4 minutes in public while visiting a bathroom (which happened often in the library of my university), there was nothing preventing me from going to their Facebook or whatever account they had open on their computer, changing the email to my own email and then clicking confirm on my inbox once I am back at my desk.

and most people don't have 2FA so that would effectively give me control of their account.
Hell, my university once had a potential data breach and they were 99.999% sure the data was not actually accessed by a malicious actor but still sent a mass email saying that they were advising everyone to change their passwords. a classmate of mine in the software systems program's attitude was basically "oh well, who cares?" and I just facepalmed internally.

there are maybe 3 websites I have come across that instead first send a confirmation email to your current inbox and after you confirm on that, then you get a confirmation email on the new email inbox. which isn't perfect but I feel like it's a bit more sensical and the best you can do without involving 2FA.

even then, that's also susceptible to the situation I described above if the user is always logged into their email.

I find it odd that websites don't prompt for a password as part of the email update process (or better yet 2FA with an app as even prompting for a password isn't a guarantee if the user has the password manager as an extension in their browser and they recently unlocked it before leaving their session unattended) to ensure that email changes are always done by the account owner.

My thoughts are that apps can have end-to-end encryption, but if the app on the end is still connected to someone's servers, there's nothing stopping them from pulling the contents of the chat after it's been decrypted on the other end. What options do we have for messaging that don't have this issue? I understand that anything that I can see can still get taken by the OS, etc., but I'm curious about that first step.