Is there an approach we're missing when it comes to technological control systems? How do we plan and allow for the 1 in 1,000,000 incidents that human judgment is better than the system? But...
Is there an approach we're missing when it comes to technological control systems? How do we plan and allow for the 1 in 1,000,000 incidents that human judgment is better than the system?
Boeing has said that the proper steps for pulling out of an incorrect activation of the system were already in flight manuals, so there was no need to detail this specific system in the new 737 jet. In a statement on Tuesday, Boeing said it could not discuss the crash while it is under investigation but reiterated that “the appropriate flight crew response to uncommanded trim, regardless of cause, is contained in existing procedures.”
But evidently that wasn't the case.
Despite Boeing’s insistence that the proper procedures were in the handbook, also called the emergency checklist, pilots have said since the accident that Boeing had not been clear about one potentially vital difference between the system on the new 737s and the older models. In the older versions, pilots could help address the problem of the nose being forced down improperly — a situation known as “runaway stabilizer trim” — by pulling back on the control column in front of them, the pilots say.
Is there an approach we're missing when it comes to technological control systems? How do we plan and allow for the 1 in 1,000,000 incidents that human judgment is better than the system?
But evidently that wasn't the case.