One of the critiques of emotivism in the article is that it leaves no room for moral discussion. I think this, strangely enough, is one of the most persuasive arguments against emotivism. I think...
One of the critiques of emotivism in the article is that it leaves no room for moral discussion. I think this, strangely enough, is one of the most persuasive arguments against emotivism. I think this is where C. L. Stevenson's work is helpful. He separates people's fundamental attitudes from specific moral beliefs they hold.
Stevenson goes further than saying moral utterances are just something like "boo murder!", but that they consist of two pieces: a declaration of the speaker's fundamental attitude and an imperative. If I say "theft is bad", what I'm saying is "I disapprove of theft" combined with the imperative for the listener to "disapprove of theft as well." This imperative portion leaves his theory one where there aren't "moral facts" (moral non-cognitivism) because an imperative isn't a fact.
There can be multiple levels here. I may have a fundamental attitude towards a specific circumstance, or towards broader categories of actions. I may say "don't steal" which means "I disapprove of theft; do so as well", but my disapproval is based on a higher order attitude like "I disapprove of actions that increase suffering; do so as well."
The door is left open for argumentation using a few methods:
Logical methods: logic can be applied to the propositional portion of moral utterances. Let's say someone says "lying is always wrong" and "telling lies to save people is okay". A contradiction can be derived from one's moral beliefs and fundamental attitudes
Rational psychological methods: this involves demonstrating that the facts that connect one's fundamental attitudes to moral beliefs are incorrect. If I see a stranger go into my neighbors house, my attitude may be "breaking into other's homes is bad" which is logically consistent with my belief that "the stranger is a bad person." A rational psychological argument could be "the stranger was invited by the neighbors over and wasn't breaking in"
Non-rational psychological methods: these are other arguments like emotional appeals, establishing rapport, etc. These methods don't need to logically connect to attitudes to be psychologically persuasive
I didn't feel that I had space in the above comment to discuss real world applications of these arguments. I think too often we neglect using non-rational psychological methods to support our...
I didn't feel that I had space in the above comment to discuss real world applications of these arguments. I think too often we neglect using non-rational psychological methods to support our positions when engaging with conservatives.
If there is a fundamental disagreement on facts, rational psychological arguments don't work. For instance, a lot of conservatives changed their minds about LGBT folks, abortions, or about a specific minority group because the issue hit home in some way; no facts were proven, no logical contradictions were derived.
I think there's absolutely a place for hypothetical arguments about violinists on life support, but I'm not sure how effective that approach is.
One of the critiques of emotivism in the article is that it leaves no room for moral discussion. I think this, strangely enough, is one of the most persuasive arguments against emotivism. I think this is where C. L. Stevenson's work is helpful. He separates people's fundamental attitudes from specific moral beliefs they hold.
Stevenson goes further than saying moral utterances are just something like "boo murder!", but that they consist of two pieces: a declaration of the speaker's fundamental attitude and an imperative. If I say "theft is bad", what I'm saying is "I disapprove of theft" combined with the imperative for the listener to "disapprove of theft as well." This imperative portion leaves his theory one where there aren't "moral facts" (moral non-cognitivism) because an imperative isn't a fact.
There can be multiple levels here. I may have a fundamental attitude towards a specific circumstance, or towards broader categories of actions. I may say "don't steal" which means "I disapprove of theft; do so as well", but my disapproval is based on a higher order attitude like "I disapprove of actions that increase suffering; do so as well."
The door is left open for argumentation using a few methods:
Logical methods: logic can be applied to the propositional portion of moral utterances. Let's say someone says "lying is always wrong" and "telling lies to save people is okay". A contradiction can be derived from one's moral beliefs and fundamental attitudes
Rational psychological methods: this involves demonstrating that the facts that connect one's fundamental attitudes to moral beliefs are incorrect. If I see a stranger go into my neighbors house, my attitude may be "breaking into other's homes is bad" which is logically consistent with my belief that "the stranger is a bad person." A rational psychological argument could be "the stranger was invited by the neighbors over and wasn't breaking in"
Non-rational psychological methods: these are other arguments like emotional appeals, establishing rapport, etc. These methods don't need to logically connect to attitudes to be psychologically persuasive
I didn't feel that I had space in the above comment to discuss real world applications of these arguments. I think too often we neglect using non-rational psychological methods to support our positions when engaging with conservatives.
If there is a fundamental disagreement on facts, rational psychological arguments don't work. For instance, a lot of conservatives changed their minds about LGBT folks, abortions, or about a specific minority group because the issue hit home in some way; no facts were proven, no logical contradictions were derived.
I think there's absolutely a place for hypothetical arguments about violinists on life support, but I'm not sure how effective that approach is.