The article (archive) describes meeting a Houthi spokesman in Oman, and then the reporter gives a history of their tangled history with Saudi Arabia, too long to quote. Some ironies: ... ... ...
The article (archive) describes meeting a Houthi spokesman in Oman, and then the reporter gives a history of their tangled history with Saudi Arabia, too long to quote. Some ironies:
Things got even worse for the Houthis in the early 1980s, when the Saudis—shaken by the Iranian revolution—began promoting their own brand of hard-line religion in northern Yemen. Yemen had never had a serious sectarian problem. But as Saudi-funded preachers spread their intolerant Wahhabi faith, the Zaydi clerics decided that they had to fight back. They trained a new generation of revivalist Zaydis who were steeped in anger at the House of Saud and its American ally. Among the most zealous was a young man named Hussein al-Houthi.
Hussein’s ambitions went far beyond defending Zaydism. He traveled to Iran and to Sudan, which was an entrepôt for all sorts of Islamists in the 1990s. When he came home, he transformed his family’s experience (and his own) into a new ideological weapon: a combustible blend of historic entitlement and outraged victimhood. He grew even more radical after Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s longtime president, pledged his full support to George W. Bush in the War on Terror, which some Islamists saw as a war on Islam. It was then that the Houthi sarkha was first heard.
Hussein’s teachings, gathered in a 2,129-page online document called the Malazim (“installments”), are now revered by the movement almost as much as the Quran itself. Gun-toting Houthi soldiers can be found scrutinizing them with a special Android smartphone app.
...
In early 2022, a Houthi missile struck an oil-distribution station in Jeddah during Formula 1’s Saudi Arabian Grand Prix, one of the kingdom’s signature tourist events. A huge plume of black smoke was visible from the track. The Saudis had made efforts toward a peace deal for several years, but this time Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman appears to have decided that enough was enough. The United Nations brokered a cease-fire a week later. Saudi negotiators, together with a UN envoy, began talking to the Houthis about a longer-term peace agreement.
...
[The accord] will transform the Houthis from a terrorist group into a state. Whether this will nudge them toward greater maturity or merely enable their worst instincts remains to be seen. It may, among other things, allow Iran to airlift weapons directly to the Houthis rather than shipping them surreptitiously in disguised boats, as it has been doing for about 15 years. The Saudis are taking these risks because MBS does not want any more disruptions to Vision 2030, his extravagant bid to transform Saudi Arabia’s economy and society.
...
In fact, the Houthis may well have been rescued—not for the first time—by a bizarre twist of fate. In early October of [2018], Saudi agents killed and dismembered the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul. Gory details of the murder leaked to the press, and a wave of fury engulfed the Saudis, who were already being criticized for their indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen. I shared that anger; I knew Khashoggi well and had many long talks with him in Riyadh. But his death became a political football whose uses were difficult to foresee at the time.
The Saudi government was forced into a defensive crouch, and international allies no longer had the patience to support its fight for an obscure port on the Red Sea. The UN organized a cease-fire that required both sides to withdraw, but the Houthis have since violated it and regained control of the port. In retrospect, it seems possible that the outrageous public murder of a single famous man became the shield for a movement that has since killed thousands of Yemenis.
I actually think that the Houthis have bitten off more than they can chew – the Saudi military is genuinely quite attrocious when it comes to competence, but the same is not true of the US/UK...
I actually think that the Houthis have bitten off more than they can chew – the Saudi military is genuinely quite attrocious when it comes to competence, but the same is not true of the US/UK navies which are modern, up-to-date and have very competent marines. Life gets harder when the Americans have a drone ready to kill you the moment a spy sattelite gets a match on the facial recognition software. The Saudi military essentially runs on nepotism and they invaded without any plan (and they're not great at planning quickly). The US government doesn't really have the same problem – they are very experienced at invading places and their military doesn't have the Saudi competence problem.
Also sinking ships in the Red Sea also doesn't exactly make them friends with China (whose manufactured stuff is on a lot of these ships) and the submarine cable stuff isn't exactly going to make them more popular. The Houthis also don't really understand shipping law, so they're just as likely to hit a Chinese owned ship because it's connected to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China's London or NYC office as they are a ship actually owned by an Israeli shipping company.
One thing about Yemeni history is that it is remarkably complicated – there are something like 2,000 tribal structures in Yemen and it's very hard to unpack it all. I think the author kind of misses this because he is a journalist rather than historian. People I think have written good works include Stephen W. Day and Noel Brehony's recent book "Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis" which explores the civil war in pretty good depth.
So when the author says "one reason the Houthis have been so poorly understood is that their movement arose in the shadow of the Saudi monarchy" I think it's really because even Western foreign policy types (e.g. diplomats) suffer from an object permanence problem where they are really only interested in the current problem, which they forget about when they move on to the next one. There's also so much stuff happening in Yemen that it is incredibly tough to keep track.
His argument is basically that the Houthis are happy because there's a lot of war and conflict going on, and this distracts from their inability to run an effective domestic administration. I don't think he really understands the Saudi motivation – they want to build a pipeline through the Al Mahrah province.
About the peace deal – it most likely won't work because (as he does point out, to his credit) the Houthis rely on war to remain in power and remain popular.
While there are definitely some economic motivations for the Saudi's, the conflict is kinda personal at this point since the Houthis have directly attacked cities in Saudi Arabia. The conflicts in...
While there are definitely some economic motivations for the Saudi's, the conflict is kinda personal at this point since the Houthis have directly attacked cities in Saudi Arabia. The conflicts in the middle east just become more complicated the deeper you get...
I don't think it's really personal for the Saudis – they are now trying to end the war, hence their proposals for a peace deal with the Houthis, as a direct result of Houthi attacks on their oil...
I don't think it's really personal for the Saudis – they are now trying to end the war, hence their proposals for a peace deal with the Houthis, as a direct result of Houthi attacks on their oil refineries and their difficulty in defending against these.
I'm not sure how I feel about this article. It has an insight into the Yemeni conflict that many pieces lack - particularly in its interviews with key actors. But despite its apparent balance, it...
I'm not sure how I feel about this article. It has an insight into the Yemeni conflict that many pieces lack - particularly in its interviews with key actors. But despite its apparent balance, it seems to be to be part of a wider trend of whitewashing Saudi Arabia's role in the conflict, something I've noticed in the last few months of Houthi attacks on cargo ships in the Red Sea. Not - to be clear - that I think the Houthis are in any way the good guys in the conflict, but Saudi Arabia's (and by extension the Western powers who have backed them's) role and impact in the war should not be minimised.
There is an appearance of balance, Saudi Arabia's role in civilian deaths is mentioned, but is couched in the excuse of poor training:
Poorly trained Saudi pilots, fearing anti-aircraft fire, dropped their bombs from too high, and indiscriminate raids killed thousands of Yemeni civilians.
Wording also suggests that Saudi Arabia's role in the peace process is purely altruistic, rather than, as the rest of article makes clear, aimed at securing its image on the world stage by minimising chances of attacks during its large events:
Saudi diplomats have been working for years on an ambitious peace plan that would ease the Houthis’ political and economic isolation and reconcile them with their rivals in Yemen’s “legitimate” government in the south.
To be clear, Saudi Arabia has fought for years isolate the Houthis both politically and economically (with blockades leading to disastrous consequences for Yemen's civilian population) and it's not their aim now, just an accepted consequence of peace when they couldn't win the war.
The article also suggests that the decision to pause the Saudi coalition's siege of the port of Hodeidah in 2018 due to fears of humanitarian catastrophe has been reassessed recently, arguing that:
Some analysts and human-rights workers now believe that those concerns were exaggerated amid an atmosphere of widespread anger at the Saudis.
Despite extensive searching I can't find anyone else online claiming this, though I'd like to see if there were commentary explaining why this would be the case, beyond the hypothetical of the Houthi's position being diminished if the siege had succeeded.
As I say, it's an interesting article but it seems to me that beneath its veneer of impartiality it has a distinctly Saudi-bent.
Part of Saudi Arabia's issue with the Houthis is they've launched direct attacks on Rayadh and other cities. It's extremely easy to justify a war abroad when that group attacks your citizens. The...
Part of Saudi Arabia's issue with the Houthis is they've launcheddirectattacks on Rayadh and other cities. It's extremely easy to justify a war abroad when that group attacks your citizens. The Houthis are also aligned with Iran; whom the Saudi's also have beef with. This obviously doesn't justify the humanitarian catastrophe their actions created, but it's important to understand where they're coming from.
The article (archive) describes meeting a Houthi spokesman in Oman, and then the reporter gives a history of their tangled history with Saudi Arabia, too long to quote. Some ironies:
...
...
...
I actually think that the Houthis have bitten off more than they can chew – the Saudi military is genuinely quite attrocious when it comes to competence, but the same is not true of the US/UK navies which are modern, up-to-date and have very competent marines. Life gets harder when the Americans have a drone ready to kill you the moment a spy sattelite gets a match on the facial recognition software. The Saudi military essentially runs on nepotism and they invaded without any plan (and they're not great at planning quickly). The US government doesn't really have the same problem – they are very experienced at invading places and their military doesn't have the Saudi competence problem.
Also sinking ships in the Red Sea also doesn't exactly make them friends with China (whose manufactured stuff is on a lot of these ships) and the submarine cable stuff isn't exactly going to make them more popular. The Houthis also don't really understand shipping law, so they're just as likely to hit a Chinese owned ship because it's connected to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China's London or NYC office as they are a ship actually owned by an Israeli shipping company.
One thing about Yemeni history is that it is remarkably complicated – there are something like 2,000 tribal structures in Yemen and it's very hard to unpack it all. I think the author kind of misses this because he is a journalist rather than historian. People I think have written good works include Stephen W. Day and Noel Brehony's recent book "Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis" which explores the civil war in pretty good depth.
So when the author says "one reason the Houthis have been so poorly understood is that their movement arose in the shadow of the Saudi monarchy" I think it's really because even Western foreign policy types (e.g. diplomats) suffer from an object permanence problem where they are really only interested in the current problem, which they forget about when they move on to the next one. There's also so much stuff happening in Yemen that it is incredibly tough to keep track.
His argument is basically that the Houthis are happy because there's a lot of war and conflict going on, and this distracts from their inability to run an effective domestic administration. I don't think he really understands the Saudi motivation – they want to build a pipeline through the Al Mahrah province.
About the peace deal – it most likely won't work because (as he does point out, to his credit) the Houthis rely on war to remain in power and remain popular.
While there are definitely some economic motivations for the Saudi's, the conflict is kinda personal at this point since the Houthis have directly attacked cities in Saudi Arabia. The conflicts in the middle east just become more complicated the deeper you get...
I don't think it's really personal for the Saudis – they are now trying to end the war, hence their proposals for a peace deal with the Houthis, as a direct result of Houthi attacks on their oil refineries and their difficulty in defending against these.
I'm not sure how I feel about this article. It has an insight into the Yemeni conflict that many pieces lack - particularly in its interviews with key actors. But despite its apparent balance, it seems to be to be part of a wider trend of whitewashing Saudi Arabia's role in the conflict, something I've noticed in the last few months of Houthi attacks on cargo ships in the Red Sea. Not - to be clear - that I think the Houthis are in any way the good guys in the conflict, but Saudi Arabia's (and by extension the Western powers who have backed them's) role and impact in the war should not be minimised.
There is an appearance of balance, Saudi Arabia's role in civilian deaths is mentioned, but is couched in the excuse of poor training:
Wording also suggests that Saudi Arabia's role in the peace process is purely altruistic, rather than, as the rest of article makes clear, aimed at securing its image on the world stage by minimising chances of attacks during its large events:
To be clear, Saudi Arabia has fought for years isolate the Houthis both politically and economically (with blockades leading to disastrous consequences for Yemen's civilian population) and it's not their aim now, just an accepted consequence of peace when they couldn't win the war.
The article also suggests that the decision to pause the Saudi coalition's siege of the port of Hodeidah in 2018 due to fears of humanitarian catastrophe has been reassessed recently, arguing that:
Despite extensive searching I can't find anyone else online claiming this, though I'd like to see if there were commentary explaining why this would be the case, beyond the hypothetical of the Houthi's position being diminished if the siege had succeeded.
As I say, it's an interesting article but it seems to me that beneath its veneer of impartiality it has a distinctly Saudi-bent.
Part of Saudi Arabia's issue with the Houthis is they've launched direct attacks on Rayadh and other cities. It's extremely easy to justify a war abroad when that group attacks your citizens. The Houthis are also aligned with Iran; whom the Saudi's also have beef with. This obviously doesn't justify the humanitarian catastrophe their actions created, but it's important to understand where they're coming from.
I don't know enough to assess this. If you know of better sources, please share!
Dammit I love how The Atlantic positions it's positions
What do you mean?