As a realist, I say: give it a year. I predict that conflicts between Ukrainians and their host European societies are inevitable after the initial honeymoon period, particularly with...
As a realist, I say: give it a year.
I predict that conflicts between Ukrainians and their host European societies are inevitable after the initial honeymoon period, particularly with non-university-educated Ukrainians. Similar to how Syrian refugees were initially warmly welcomed.
Extrapolating from the labor tensions that arose in past decades when Eastern Europeans—especially from Poland—took advantage of freedom of movement to work as laborers in the west (see anti-Polish attitudes in Brexit), even more severe labor tensions will arise from the surge of Ukrainian refugees desperate for any kind of paying work who will undercut and displace local labor.
Furthermore, the sudden surge of Ukrainian workers who don't speak their host nation's language will far outstrip host economies' capacities to absorb labor. Educated Ukrainian professionals who don't speak the host nation language or English will locked out of the professional market and will suffer a loss of dignity, opportunity, and income — and this too will be a source of social tension.
On the cultural front... while Ukrainians are relatively more liberal than Russians and are culturally closer to Western Europeans than Syrians are, Ukrainians on a whole are far more conservative. In the coming months, I think conservative Ukrainian attitudes around gender, sexuality, etc. will generate significant friction in liberal societies.
Overall, compared to the Syrian refugee crisis, I predict much, much more socioeconomic tension, and significantly less but still some cultural tension.
As a realist, I say: give it a year.
I predict that conflicts between Ukrainians and their host European societies are inevitable after the initial honeymoon period, particularly with non-university-educated Ukrainians. Similar to how Syrian refugees were initially warmly welcomed.
Extrapolating from the labor tensions that arose in past decades when Eastern Europeans—especially from Poland—took advantage of freedom of movement to work as laborers in the west (see anti-Polish attitudes in Brexit), even more severe labor tensions will arise from the surge of Ukrainian refugees desperate for any kind of paying work who will undercut and displace local labor.
Furthermore, the sudden surge of Ukrainian workers who don't speak their host nation's language will far outstrip host economies' capacities to absorb labor. Educated Ukrainian professionals who don't speak the host nation language or English will locked out of the professional market and will suffer a loss of dignity, opportunity, and income — and this too will be a source of social tension.
On the cultural front... while Ukrainians are relatively more liberal than Russians and are culturally closer to Western Europeans than Syrians are, Ukrainians on a whole are far more conservative. In the coming months, I think conservative Ukrainian attitudes around gender, sexuality, etc. will generate significant friction in liberal societies.
Overall, compared to the Syrian refugee crisis, I predict much, much more socioeconomic tension, and significantly less but still some cultural tension.