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From the article:
Henadii and Mykhailo spent more than six months in this so-called kill zone, holed up in a half-destroyed house. They could hear drones buzzing overhead nonstop, like traffic on a busy highway. To avoid detection, they relieved themselves in bags rather than step outside; slept pressed together in winter rather than light a fire; and dragged the bodies of Russian soldiers they had killed into their house, so drones overhead would not detect signs of fighting.
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When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, the war looked markedly different. The battlefield had clear boundaries, similar to what generations of soldiers had known in wars past. The Russian and Ukrainian Armies massed troops and fought from trenches separated by a no-man’s land. Combat was confined to a narrow area, with troops resting safely a few miles behind the front.
Then came the drones, with their constant surveillance, pinpoint strike precision and a reach that keeps expanding with technological improvements. As a result, the front has blurred into a miles-wide wasteland where neither side holds firm control, and where towns and villages that once stood safely behind the lines now bristle with danger.
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Soldiers used to march to the front across open fields.
Now, they crawl at night under thermal blankets to reduce their heat signatures.
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The kill zone has also transformed life at the front. Missions that once lasted a few days stretch into months because rotating troops under a drone-filled sky is too dangerous.
Henadii, 52, and Mykhailo, 51, described those months as hell. With vehicles unable to reach the front, food and water were dropped by drones. The drops sometimes failed, leaving them hungry and thirsty. Each lost 40 pounds. No medic could treat Mykhailo’s injured heel; his unit could only fly in medicine. For fellow soldiers badly wounded and in need of evacuation, the only option was often a robotic ground vehicle sent to carry them out.
As technology advances, experts say, the kill zone will grow only wider and deadlier. Drones flying farther will push the fighting into cities once considered safe. Artificial intelligence will sharpen targeting systems, shortening the time between detection and strike. The biggest cost, commanders say, will be borne by the soldiers on the ground, whose presence in the kill zone remains as crucial as ever to capture and hold land.
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The mission of the commander, whose call sign is Stepanych, is to create a lethal cordon, impassable for Russian troops in an area near Henadii’s and Mykhailo’s position in Primorske. He has deployed attack drone crews roughly every two miles along the 10-mile stretch of front that is under his command. Together, they launch about 100 drones a day, keeping several in the air at any given time so they can be redirected to new targets within minutes.
The Russian Army, Stepanych said, “does the same thing.” Russian battlefield reports reviewed by The New York Times show that, on a single day in May, Russia had 199 reconnaissance drones ready to be launched near Primorske, with at least 62 Russian crews operating short-range attack drones in support.
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To reach their position, they followed a route mapped in advance that kept them off paths more visible from the sky. Overhead, a Ukrainian reconnaissance drone tracked their progress, streaming live video to officers in the rear who guided them by radio. Intercepted Russian drone feeds helped the officers warn them when enemy drones approached.
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Soldiers no longer cluster in trenches — an easy target for drones. Instead, they spread out in small groups, hiding in underground shelters. A position is often held by only two soldiers, as shown in the Russian battlefield reports reviewed by The Times, which detail Russian troop deployments near Kamianske, a village south of Primorske.
The front has become so fuzzy that opposing troops sometimes shelter in the same building.
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From their hideout, Henadii and Mykhailo repeatedly watched Russian troops advancing in small assault groups of only a few soldiers to minimize detection. Not long ago, they would have opened fire. But in the kill zone, using your rifle can be a deadly mistake, revealing your position to drones overhead.
So they operated as reconnaissance troops, watching for Russian soldiers and radioing their movements. Drones would do the killing.
“Neither side wants their infantry doing too much of the fighting,” said Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute who studies the war in Ukraine. “They want drones to do the fighting.”
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The rise of drones has fueled a debate in Ukraine over whether they could one day replace infantry altogether.
Dmytro Putiata, a former Ukrainian drone operator, said drones were a formidable force multiplier but would never fully replace infantry. Drones can destroy positions, he said, but cannot seize them. Only soldiers can dislodge troops from entrenched dugouts. As for land drones armed with machine guns that have joined some assaults, he asked: “What happens when the battery dies?”
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An infantry company commander in Henadii’s and Mykhailo’s brigade said his unit had stopped delivering food to frontline positions by vehicle in November, switching entirely to drones.
Russia’s Army also appears to have made the shift. On a single day in mid-May, drones made 678 flights across a large section of the southern front, delivering roughly 4,500 pounds of cargo — mostly food, water and ammunition — according to the battlefield reports obtained by The Times.
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The journey home would be the most dangerous part of their deployment. The kill zone had expanded so much in six months that a mile-long walk in had transformed into a six-mile trek out. It would take them days.
To improve their chances, Maksym, their commander, had planned the route meticulously. He had identified roads poorly visible from the sky and marked houses every 150 yards where they could take cover. Supply packages were dropped in advance at each overnight stop.
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