I think that the biggest pitfall of blockchain technology as a solution is that it's a "black box" solution to your average person. That is, your average person is unlikely to understand it and...
I think that the biggest pitfall of blockchain technology as a solution is that it's a "black box" solution to your average person. That is, your average person is unlikely to understand it and would be forced to have faith that it's not being tampered with, and because of this there's no way they can trust it inherently. Paper ballots, on the other hand, are an inherently trustworthy system to them because they're physical, easy to understand, and difficult to tamper with so long as the ballot boxes are closely monitored.
Blockchain would likely find its use as a publicly accessible validation measure for the technologically-inclined.
Here's a recommendation: Do both. Have both a centralized, authoritative government body that performs the paper ballot counts, and have decentralized and open-sourced blockchain validation....
Here's a recommendation: Do both. Have both a centralized, authoritative government body that performs the paper ballot counts, and have decentralized and open-sourced blockchain validation. Compare the results of both and look for discrepancies. In the case of discrepancies that are significant or result in different election outcomes, require an immediate, public, and closely monitored recount. If those discrepancies still exist, then immediately open an investigation to determine the cause of the discrepancy (e.g. missing paper ballots, voting machine breaches, etc.) and yield a final decision once the cause has been determined.
They're not a black box though. At least in Canada, each candidate has at least one person they trust at each voting station, who is part of the audit process. Basically a ballot is read by...
...they're still a black box to the everyday person. Sure, there's a lot of scrutiny over who has access to it, but in the end, you're entrusting you're vote to be properly counted by someone else.
They're not a black box though. At least in Canada, each candidate has at least one person they trust at each voting station, who is part of the audit process. Basically a ballot is read by someone representing each candidate and then added to the correct pile.
I'm not sure there's a digital equivalent of this in Blockchain.
As one of the most experienced blockchain experts, let me say this upfront: blockchains are completely useless for political voting. Sure, you can use them, but a non-blockchain can do the same...
Voting seems like a no-brainer application for Blockchain technology, and its transparency and immutability offer some immediate benefits.
As one of the most experienced blockchain experts, let me say this upfront: blockchains are completely useless for political voting. Sure, you can use them, but a non-blockchain can do the same thing better.
My idea is a system where voters still register and walk into booths as they do today, but once they submit their vote electronically, a keypair is created on the spot for them, with the option to print out their public key.
Public key cryptography is not "blockchain". I absolutely agree PKC is useful for electronic voting.
This offers a couple of key benefits:
Accountability: You can always input your public key and see your vote. This can ensure no tampering is done, and you can ensure the integrity of your vote during the entire election.
This doesn't disprove tampering. If you wanted to tamper, you'd just inflate the system with extra "voters".
Visibility: With a system like this, the blockchain could be made public. As each keypair is generated at the time of voting, they are, for all intents and purposes, completely anonymous. This will allow any third party to monitor votes coming in real time, removing the dependency on a centralized body to count the votes, allowing anyone to see exactly how the votes are shaping up.
You don't need a blockchain for this. Simply publishing votes as they come in is sufficient. You could even just use plain old numbers for the public interface, since nobody will presumably know anyone else's key.
Two questions: How would you ensure that your vote is actually counted though? (and not just logged) Do you think there may be an issue with staying anonymous, if you're checking your vote...
Accountability: You can always input your public key and see your vote. This can ensure no tampering is done, and you can ensure the integrity of your vote during the entire election.
Two questions:
How would you ensure that your vote is actually counted though? (and not just logged)
Do you think there may be an issue with staying anonymous, if you're checking your vote remotely or at some sort of station?
@Emerald_Knight wrote my thoughts better in their response. Guess my question was more of how would you convince the average voter that they plug in this key and 1) the vote they see is theirs,...
This is easy if the entire blockchain is publicly visible. Anyone can traverse the blockchain and tally up the votes themselves. While it's not really possible to see if any single, individual vote is counted, it is possible to check and audit the final numbers.
@Emerald_Knight wrote my thoughts better in their response. Guess my question was more of how would you convince the average voter that they plug in this key and 1) the vote they see is theirs, and 2) that it is correctly summed.
I think ultimately any system in place, electronic or not, has to be trusted. My question is more social than technical. Of course there isn't always a perfect software to physical relationship,...
I think ultimately any system in place, electronic or not, has to be trusted. My question is more social than technical. Of course there isn't always a perfect software to physical relationship, but maybe this will help explain my thoughts.
Traditional system:
A voter marks a sheet of paper - they can see that it's been marked
They drop their ballot into the ballot box and they know it's physically in there
When it comes to using Blockchain
A voter submits their vote - assume they'll get some indication it's done
They (probably still at the station), use a public key to confirm their vote, and maybe see it in the chain
Tildes is a pretty technical crowd, so public key makes sense here. But for the average voter, they will just have to trust that using their public key is returning their vote. And this may sound stupid, but I'm sure someone will question if everyone can see their vote because they hear "public".
Hope this makes more sense.
Edit to add: And just a thought, it may not be a good idea to be able to verify your vote anywhere outside of a voting booth at a voting station. This protects votes from being bought (to some extent).
As far as I understand the laws of the US, this is explicitly not allowed. You can't take a photo of your ballot or mark it in any identifiable way or it becomes inadmissible, for example. Since...
Accountability: You can always input your public key and see your vote.
As far as I understand the laws of the US, this is explicitly not allowed. You can't take a photo of your ballot or mark it in any identifiable way or it becomes inadmissible, for example. Since someone could be bribing, or otherwise coercing you to vote a certain way, being able to prove how you voted is out of the question.
Computer scanned paper ballots please. After it is scanned, I would like a receipt with a key printed on it. Then I would like to be able to use my key when I log into vote.gov to see how my votes...
Computer scanned paper ballots please.
After it is scanned, I would like a receipt with a key printed on it. Then I would like to be able to use my key when I log into vote.gov to see how my votes were counted and to see it being used in a pubic immutable ledger of the overall local and national vote tally.
All code MUST be open source. The paper ballots should be stored for a good long white after the vote to allow a true recount.
I go back-and-forth on how big a deal coercion is. Your system is vulnerable to coercion (someone can sell their vote, or be forced to vote a certain way), which is a common problem that a lot of...
I go back-and-forth on how big a deal coercion is. Your system is vulnerable to coercion (someone can sell their vote, or be forced to vote a certain way), which is a common problem that a lot of "all the votes are public" systems face.
On the one hand, I like that the pencil-and-paper balloting system is basically impenetrable to coercion, and it seems a shame to give that up. On the other hand, from places that have adopted electronic voting, I haven't heard horror stories of coercion becoming a big problem....
How we vote should evolve but electronic means for ease and simplification doesn't provide enough benefits, imo. Rather than have the majority going to polling stations to vote on one day, why not...
How we vote should evolve but electronic means for ease and simplification doesn't provide enough benefits, imo. Rather than have the majority going to polling stations to vote on one day, why not mailed ballots for those with home addresses. Many states do have early voting with mail in ballots that are then mailed back or delivered to a polling area. Voting by troops and those living overseas is done this way.
This allows the voter to:
Consider/research candidates and referendum issues without the pressures of time constraints.
Ease of voting for those with disabilities of vision or mobility increased and provides time for assistance if needed.
Those with demanding work schedules ease of voting increased without encroaching on work time or demanding family schedules.
Paper and pen can't be manipulated.
With early voting, the strains of traffic, long lines, time constraints and people resources to man stations are more manageable on voting day.
Another consideration are the ever increasing selective means to limit voting some states are implementing. Those issues where people are pulled off the voting rolls for various reason etc. can be worked out in advance through early mail notification that there is an (specified) issue that needs resolution before they can vote (which should be a required federal mandate of purging voting rolls-let me dream people) rather than a nasty surprise on voting day.
I think that the biggest pitfall of blockchain technology as a solution is that it's a "black box" solution to your average person. That is, your average person is unlikely to understand it and would be forced to have faith that it's not being tampered with, and because of this there's no way they can trust it inherently. Paper ballots, on the other hand, are an inherently trustworthy system to them because they're physical, easy to understand, and difficult to tamper with so long as the ballot boxes are closely monitored.
Blockchain would likely find its use as a publicly accessible validation measure for the technologically-inclined.
Here's a recommendation: Do both. Have both a centralized, authoritative government body that performs the paper ballot counts, and have decentralized and open-sourced blockchain validation. Compare the results of both and look for discrepancies. In the case of discrepancies that are significant or result in different election outcomes, require an immediate, public, and closely monitored recount. If those discrepancies still exist, then immediately open an investigation to determine the cause of the discrepancy (e.g. missing paper ballots, voting machine breaches, etc.) and yield a final decision once the cause has been determined.
They're not a black box though. At least in Canada, each candidate has at least one person they trust at each voting station, who is part of the audit process. Basically a ballot is read by someone representing each candidate and then added to the correct pile.
I'm not sure there's a digital equivalent of this in Blockchain.
As one of the most experienced blockchain experts, let me say this upfront: blockchains are completely useless for political voting. Sure, you can use them, but a non-blockchain can do the same thing better.
Public key cryptography is not "blockchain". I absolutely agree PKC is useful for electronic voting.
This doesn't disprove tampering. If you wanted to tamper, you'd just inflate the system with extra "voters".
You don't need a blockchain for this. Simply publishing votes as they come in is sufficient. You could even just use plain old numbers for the public interface, since nobody will presumably know anyone else's key.
Two questions:
Love the topic, btw.
@Emerald_Knight wrote my thoughts better in their response. Guess my question was more of how would you convince the average voter that they plug in this key and 1) the vote they see is theirs, and 2) that it is correctly summed.
I think ultimately any system in place, electronic or not, has to be trusted. My question is more social than technical. Of course there isn't always a perfect software to physical relationship, but maybe this will help explain my thoughts.
Traditional system:
When it comes to using Blockchain
Tildes is a pretty technical crowd, so public key makes sense here. But for the average voter, they will just have to trust that using their public key is returning their vote. And this may sound stupid, but I'm sure someone will question if everyone can see their vote because they hear "public".
Hope this makes more sense.
Edit to add: And just a thought, it may not be a good idea to be able to verify your vote anywhere outside of a voting booth at a voting station. This protects votes from being bought (to some extent).
As far as I understand the laws of the US, this is explicitly not allowed. You can't take a photo of your ballot or mark it in any identifiable way or it becomes inadmissible, for example. Since someone could be bribing, or otherwise coercing you to vote a certain way, being able to prove how you voted is out of the question.
Computer scanned paper ballots please.
After it is scanned, I would like a receipt with a key printed on it. Then I would like to be able to use my key when I log into vote.gov to see how my votes were counted and to see it being used in a pubic immutable ledger of the overall local and national vote tally.
All code MUST be open source. The paper ballots should be stored for a good long white after the vote to allow a true recount.
If there was a National ID system you could do even voting online but it comes with the terrible side effect of having to make a National ID system.
I go back-and-forth on how big a deal coercion is. Your system is vulnerable to coercion (someone can sell their vote, or be forced to vote a certain way), which is a common problem that a lot of "all the votes are public" systems face.
On the one hand, I like that the pencil-and-paper balloting system is basically impenetrable to coercion, and it seems a shame to give that up. On the other hand, from places that have adopted electronic voting, I haven't heard horror stories of coercion becoming a big problem....
How we vote should evolve but electronic means for ease and simplification doesn't provide enough benefits, imo. Rather than have the majority going to polling stations to vote on one day, why not mailed ballots for those with home addresses. Many states do have early voting with mail in ballots that are then mailed back or delivered to a polling area. Voting by troops and those living overseas is done this way.
This allows the voter to:
Consider/research candidates and referendum issues without the pressures of time constraints.
Ease of voting for those with disabilities of vision or mobility increased and provides time for assistance if needed.
Those with demanding work schedules ease of voting increased without encroaching on work time or demanding family schedules.
Paper and pen can't be manipulated.
With early voting, the strains of traffic, long lines, time constraints and people resources to man stations are more manageable on voting day.
Another consideration are the ever increasing selective means to limit voting some states are implementing. Those issues where people are pulled off the voting rolls for various reason etc. can be worked out in advance through early mail notification that there is an (specified) issue that needs resolution before they can vote (which should be a required federal mandate of purging voting rolls-let me dream people) rather than a nasty surprise on voting day.