[T]o assume that the fate of Baltic nations hinged only upon developments in Washington or Moscow is to unduly ignore the role played by the Baltic peoples themselves.
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What set the breakaway Baltics apart from other former Soviet republics is that, shortly after regaining independence, they were clear-eyed regarding their geopolitical predicament. They accurately assessed that the 1990s constituted a rare historical irregularity, a window of opportunity that would not last forever. An internal Estonian foreign ministry memo in 1993 crystallized the strategic mindset of the newly independent republic: “the most important lesson is simple: time is short and time will not wait for small nations.” Former Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga, who shepherded Latvia through the membership process, likewise attests that one of the principal lessons for small nations is that they always ought to stay vigilant and, when “cracks in the march of history” occur, immediately try to seize such moments. Baltic leaders recognized that because of the relative weakness of Russia and the high-water mark moment of American power, they were granted an unusual degree of political maneuvering. They acted without hesitation, before Moscow clawed its way back into a stronger position.
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Severely lacking in diplomatic representation abroad, Baltic policymakers would use every opportunity to argue their case internationally. When in 1992 world leaders gathered in Rio de Janeiro to discuss environmental politics and sign the Kyoto Protocol, Baltic representatives used the venue to “hunt down” European heads of state in order to sway them on the importance of getting the Soviet troops out. The Clinton administration played an instrumental role in mediating and accelerating this official divorce. In retrospect, this was a crucial inflection point which, if unresolved, could have taken the Baltics in a different strategic direction. According to long-time Estonian diplomat Jüri Luik, keeping Russian troops on Baltic soil was Moscow’s “strongest card to play” if it were to destabilize this region. Even a minimal Russian presence for a longer time, in his view, would have ended Baltic dreams of a transatlantic alliance.
NATO as the ultimate strategic objective had been weighing on the minds of Baltic statesman as soon as independence was achieved. Officially, however, the desire to move towards this goal was played down in order not to jeopardize ongoing Russian troop withdrawal. In 1995, with the Russian army finally gone, it was now also on their lips. Already, the Lithuanian President had unconventionally applied for alliance membership via an open letter. It became clear, however, that the Baltic states movement towards the transatlantic alliance would not be possible through individual efforts. As a former Latvian ambassador to the United States explained, “It was very clear to us in Washington that if one country pursued something and wanted to get Congress to approve it, they wouldn’t get it unless all three agreed.” In pursuit of the principal geopolitical goal, the Baltics banded together.
From the blog post:
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