The basic idea seems to be that it’s unlikely that any “big history” is correct, because they are necessarily too sweeping. A small quote from an interesting discussion: […]
The basic idea seems to be that it’s unlikely that any “big history” is correct, because they are necessarily too sweeping. A small quote from an interesting discussion:
[…] big history out of necessity forces the historian (or journalist, or some other professional) to make “it rained all day yesterday” statements about massive swaths of time, groups of people, cultures, belief systems, or virtually any other subject one might touch upon. To truly perform big history, one has to go big: in doing this, it’s not like there is nothing lost. I’d argue that what’s almost always lost is the truth. Now I’m the case of the weather or the details of a basketball game the truth might not be very problematic. But when we’re talking about history, which deals with humanity, with people, with concepts and ideas that absolutely inform on a daily basis how we think about and take action on the world around us, this is HUGELY important.
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If we go back to our less-controversial "rainy day" example: if I ask the question "Why does it rain all day in the Spring in Europe, but it never rains all day in Asia?" I may be able to find some interesting hypothesis, and come to a conclusive thesis that "proves" why Europe has all-day rain and Asia does not--but my thesis only works if my propositions are true! If it does NOT rain all day in Europe, then any thesis I derive from that assumption is INCORRECT outright. This is basic logical theory: my propositions must be true for the conclusion to be valid. This is where big histories fall flat.
The basic idea seems to be that it’s unlikely that any “big history” is correct, because they are necessarily too sweeping. A small quote from an interesting discussion:
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