11 votes

Only the Middle East can fix the Middle East – The path to a post-American regional order

3 comments

  1. [2]
    stu2b50
    Link
    It’s pretty inevitable that the US will stop involving themselves in the Middle East. Not only has success been limited, but the strategic value of the region has changed drastically over the last...

    It’s pretty inevitable that the US will stop involving themselves in the Middle East. Not only has success been limited, but the strategic value of the region has changed drastically over the last few decades. As is often joked to this day, the US use to import almost 60% of its oil from the Middle East.

    What the continuation of these jokes has missed is that that’s very much not true anymore. The US is now the largest oil producer in the world, and a net exporter. That doesn’t mean the US is immune to market fluctuations from actions by OPEC, but it means that it’s no longer disproportionately affected. When OPEC cuts output that also hurts them. The US can more than afford to play chicken now.

    It turns, the only desert the US needed to invade was in Texas, and the only invading force it needed was water.

    8 votes
    1. ignorabimus
      Link Parent
      Well that and ~73,000 troops.

      It turns, the only desert the US needed to invade was in Texas, and the only invading force it needed was water.

      Well that and ~73,000 troops.

      5 votes
  2. ignorabimus
    Link
    excerpts TL;DR People are starting to care about the Palestinians again, and regional dynamics are horribly complex and the US would like to get out US power is limited: Iran-Saudi rapprochement...

    excerpts

    TL;DR People are starting to care about the Palestinians again, and regional dynamics are horribly complex and the US would like to get out

    October 7 upended this approach, underscoring the centrality of the Palestinian issue and forcing the United States into more direct military engagement. Yet remarkably, the war in Gaza has not led to significant shifts in Washington’s underlying policy orientation. The administration continues to push for Saudi normalization despite Israeli opposition to a separate state for the Palestinians, which the Saudis have made a condition of any such agreement. And U.S. officials seem unlikely to end their effort to disentangle the United States from Middle East conflicts. If anything, the war’s increasingly complicated dynamics may result in even less U.S. appetite for engagement in the region. Doubling down on commitments in the Middle East is also not likely to be a winning strategy for either American political party in a crucial election year.

    US power is limited:

    the United States has struggled to contain military pressure from Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Since the start of the war, U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria have faced more than 150 attacks from these groups. And despite a series of retaliatory strikes by the United States and the United Kingdom, Washington has been unable to put an end to the Houthis’ relentless missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea. Already, the Houthis have been able to cause significant disruptions to international trade, forcing major shipping companies to avoid the Suez Canal. Notably, U.S. attempts to corral a multinational maritime force to counter the threat have been unable to attract regional partners such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, which remain wary of the administration’s Gaza policies.

    Iran-Saudi rapprochement (probably good news for Yemen)

    Rather than derailing relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Gaza war seems to have strengthened them. In November 2023, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi attended a rare joint meeting of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation hosted by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh, and the following month, Iranian and Saudi leaders met again in Beijing to discuss the Gaza war. The two countries have also planned an exchange of state visits by Raisi and Mohammed in the coming months—meetings that are supposed to formalize new economic and security ties. And despite simmering tensions over the Houthis in particular, the Iranian and Saudi foreign ministers met at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2024, as well.

    3 votes