The problem is similar to Microsoft Recall on Windows: Google and Apple are integrating agentic capabilities like Gemini Intelligence with Google Gemini and Onscreen Awareness with Siri AI deep into their operating systems. This is a significant move. Google (Android), Apple (iOS/macOS), and Microsoft (Windows) produce the three major consumer operating systems (OS), which comprise the environment that third-party developers – like Signal – build their apps to function and operate within. To put it differently, these three operating systems are the oceans in which Signal, and other applications, must swim; they dictate the conditions of life for the application ecosystem. Right now, these agentic AI integrations are changing this environment in a way that’s making it increasingly hostile to privacy. This is an existential threat to Signal, and our ability to responsibly uphold our mission.
In order to gain access to information about you, these OS AI agents “scan” the information that’s on your screen. In doing so, your Signal data is captured, then made available to these agentic systems in order to allow them to answer your questions and do your bidding.
The net result is that these AI capabilities in the operating system are undermining Signal’s ability to independently guarantee privacy. For over a decade, this guarantee has been backed by our tried and trusted open source code base and our formally verified encryption protocol. These have been scrutinized by some of the best security experts and hackers across the world, and shown to be robust. Now, in service of AI agentic capabilities, your sensitive data is being captured, stored, and made accessible to whatever local database or remote server an OS-level AI agent is using at that moment. All of this is outside of Signal’s control once the data has been captured, and imperils the privacy of all the participants in a conversation.
So, we are blocking such capture by preventing screenshots in the app on iOS 27 and when AI assistants attempt to capture screen data on Android.
People who want the ability to take screenshots can disable this protection within the Signal app’s settings. However, doing so will potentially expose your (and your contacts’) Signal content to these AI agents, and break our privacy guarantees. Our remedy is also incomplete – while we are doing everything we can, restricting screenshots does not address other more sneaky ways AI agents could potentially access application data, such as retrieving content already present on a user’s device via the filesystem.
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We continue to call on the major consumer operating system companies – Apple, Google, and Microsoft – to provide simple technical tools and accurate documentation that give developers like Signal ways to prevent AI agents from accessing sensitive application data. In particular, we are calling on these companies to provide two common-sense remedies that can protect the privacy so many millions of people rely on:
Developers should have an easy and well-documented way to opt their app out of AI data access and processing, including (but not limited to) screen reading, filesystem access, notifications, APIs, and other OS frameworks, all without undermining the core utility of an application.
Operating system companies should create better documentation and technical specifications around how these AI agents function, particularly regarding data access and processing. Confidential computing approaches are not a complete solution, and do not address these core concerns. In particular, these approaches still leave the power to determine the extent of privacy guarantees (if any) in the hands of these providers.
From the article:
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