They're gonna be correct almost by definition. Unless they royally fuck up their update to the mcas system, every 737 max pilot now knows how to disable that MCAS system and how to detect it going...
They're gonna be correct almost by definition. Unless they royally fuck up their update to the mcas system, every 737 max pilot now knows how to disable that MCAS system and how to detect it going nuts. Ground crews will probably pay extra attention to the AoA sensors. After two of the same accidents, I don't believe for a second that the same accident could occur anytime soon. Still means they need a decent fix to this system for the long run, our collective mind has too short memory.
Still some design decisions I shall never understand in the original MCAS. Why no warnings at all if the system engages? Why just keep the system on once the AoA sensors disagree and not just blare a stall warning? Standard procedure for a stall seems to be anyway to get the nose down first and then fire up the engines, so the feared pitch up is not too bad of a problem if pilots are aware of the stall.
(Edit: upon second thought, the fact that a AoA sensor can't be detected as failing is puzzling to me. Given that the aircraft knows its attitude, accelerations, aerodynamics and airspeed, the AoA can be reasonably constrained to within a narrow margin. If it's beyond these margins, that could only be explained by ridiculous amounts of upwards wind, at least in normal flight, or a AoA sensor failure. That seems to me like a good sanity check on an AoA reading - or any of the other sensors. In general: Aircraft are predictable systems with lots of sensors. A single sensor failure should as a rule be easily identifiable - thus the aircraft should itself fall back to the redundant sensor or at least call into question the relevant instruments it shows and actions it takes.)
As a casual observer of the aviation industry, maybe Airbus is onto something with their idea of giving the aircraft final control in normal circumstances - it just allows more seamless integration of control systems and the pilot should be more aware that these systems are in place. Boeing claiming to give complete control to the pilot and then sneakily installing a very authoritative system like this might have contributed to the accidents.
They're gonna be correct almost by definition. Unless they royally fuck up their update to the mcas system, every 737 max pilot now knows how to disable that MCAS system and how to detect it going nuts. Ground crews will probably pay extra attention to the AoA sensors. After two of the same accidents, I don't believe for a second that the same accident could occur anytime soon. Still means they need a decent fix to this system for the long run, our collective mind has too short memory.
Still some design decisions I shall never understand in the original MCAS. Why no warnings at all if the system engages? Why just keep the system on once the AoA sensors disagree and not just blare a stall warning? Standard procedure for a stall seems to be anyway to get the nose down first and then fire up the engines, so the feared pitch up is not too bad of a problem if pilots are aware of the stall.
(Edit: upon second thought, the fact that a AoA sensor can't be detected as failing is puzzling to me. Given that the aircraft knows its attitude, accelerations, aerodynamics and airspeed, the AoA can be reasonably constrained to within a narrow margin. If it's beyond these margins, that could only be explained by ridiculous amounts of upwards wind, at least in normal flight, or a AoA sensor failure. That seems to me like a good sanity check on an AoA reading - or any of the other sensors. In general: Aircraft are predictable systems with lots of sensors. A single sensor failure should as a rule be easily identifiable - thus the aircraft should itself fall back to the redundant sensor or at least call into question the relevant instruments it shows and actions it takes.)
As a casual observer of the aviation industry, maybe Airbus is onto something with their idea of giving the aircraft final control in normal circumstances - it just allows more seamless integration of control systems and the pilot should be more aware that these systems are in place. Boeing claiming to give complete control to the pilot and then sneakily installing a very authoritative system like this might have contributed to the accidents.