This is an excellent paper that serves to highlight some of the ways in which progressive "deference epistemology" often fails to accomplish its fundamental telos, for the reason that the "room"...
This is an excellent paper that serves to highlight some of the ways in which progressive "deference epistemology" often fails to accomplish its fundamental telos, for the reason that the "room" in which one making such a deference is situated is most likely going to be filled with other people for whom such an epistemology is inherently only partially applicable; and therefore a truly meaningful deference to the intended epistemology of marginalization in question is not possible. i.e. without taking intersectional theory into account, implementing deferential standpoint theory (positionality) is an insufficient way to ensure that the most "authentic" experience is the one being told in the "outsized" Rooms Where It Matters (so to speak), because a single element of one's positionality only describes a part of their identity. I believe that this is an important commentary to make in an academic environment where progressives are interested in addressing social issues by means of diversifying the speakers on their soapboxes. By recognizing when it is and is not meaningful to defer to a given person, activists are less likely to be led to the "elite capture" spoken about in the article. The necessity of such a careful implementation of deference epistemology, however, begs the question of whether such an approach has any value to begin with, lacking present diversity in such spheres. The piece's thesis hones in persuasively on a "constructive approach to putting standpoint epistemology into practice," rather than a deferential one.
Most relevant here is the case of Professor Táíwò (the author) and freelance journalist Helen. She defers in good faith to the voice of Táíwò, who carries a marginalized identity but who is also privileged in other ways. However, she does so with the assumption that, because of said marginalized identity, Táíwò is therefore "a marginalized person,"—as though one is, as an entire person, either marginalized or not marginalized—ignoring the reality of his position. Therefore, Helen is not in fact allowing for the ideally authentic experiential scene to be painted, but rather encouraging a somewhat unrepresentative member of a marginalized group to speak for that group. Certainly the experience of a racially marginalized person in such matters where it is relevant is preferable to some extent than that of someone completely lacking in such a perspective, even if the professor's economic background does not extend this marginalization to the point assumed by Helen. I would very much argue, for example, that the classist undertones in much of Virginia Woolf's work do not wholly invalidate her significance to the feminist literary canon. But, as the author lays out, beyond the obvious problem of not addressing a marginalized group's lack of representation, poorly informed manifestations of epistemic deference have the added problem of actively misrepresenting said group. Just as one would be at fault in using Woolf to singularly represent "the feminine perspective of the early 20th century," as that category implicitly contains persons of whom Woolf is not representative, Táíwò's Blackness ought not overshadow his status as a tenure-track professor from a family that he describes as being relatively privileged.
Táíwò's comparison of this phenomenon to trickle-down economics is jarring to an academic left traditionally in disdain of such theories, and I think that it is for that reason that it particularly struck me.
Elites from marginalized groups can benefit from this arrangement in ways that are compatible with social progress. But treating group elites’ interests as necessarily or even presumptively aligned with full group interests involves a political naiveté we cannot afford. Such treatment of elite interests functions as a racial Reaganomics: a strategy reliant on fantasies about the exchange rate between the attention economy and the material economy.
Perhaps the lucky few who get jobs finding the most culturally authentic and cosmetically radical description of the continuing carnage are really winning one for the culture. Then, after we in the chattering class get the clout we deserve and secure the bag, its contents will eventually trickle down to the workers who clean up after our conferences, to slums of the Global South’s megacities, to its countryside.
But probably not.
Scathing. I suppose that this excerpt also speaks to the gap that exists between academic elites and "the real world"—perhaps a mile in length, it may as well be a light-year in perspective. For instance, progressive student groups engaging in academically informed political activism at universities are often criticized for the "irrelevancy" of their ideas to "actually marginalized people"; i.e. critics argue that academia is a bubble offering unrepresentative solutions by and for unrepresentative members of marginalized groups. Depending on the circumstances, this may not be an unreasonable characterization. But it may also miss the intended audience of such discourse altogether, which is the relatively privileged set of students enrolled at the institution.
To this point, of significance in Táíwò's article is the caveat that "those in powerful rooms may be “elites” relative to the larger group they represent, but this guarantees nothing about how they are treated in the rooms they are in." This is where I feel the issue of the "deferential approach to standpoint epistemology" is substantially less relevant. In providing meta-criticism on, for example, an academic institution's mistreatment of its racially marginalized but economically non-marginalized faculty, only the first characteristic is of note. Compared to faculty who are non-marginalized in both of the above categories—all other factors being equal, for the sake of argument—any form of epistemological deference is valid by default. In an environment where its systemic failings are not applicable, of course it still serves to provide a more representative platform for marginalized groups. As the professor puts it, "Deference epistemology responds to real, morally weighty experiences of being put down, ignored, sidelined, or silenced. It thus has an important non-epistemic appeal to members of stigmatized or marginalized groups: it intervenes directly in morally consequential practices of giving attention and respect."
But despite its defensible raison d'être, the real point Táíwò is making is not just about fine-tuning our implementation of deferential standpoint epistemology in future attempts to diversify the room. Such an approach can be effective in "creating an accurate representation of trauma," but implicitly shifts the burden of activism to the marginalized, and the marginalized alone. He suggests that we avoid this "abdication of responsibility" on behalf of the non-marginalized that is prompted by deference epistemology by instead taking a more active role in social advocacy.
How would a constructive approach to putting standpoint epistemology into practice differ from a deferential approach? A constructive approach would focus on the pursuit of specific goals or end results rather than avoiding “complicity” in injustice or adhering to moral principles. It would be concerned primarily with building institutions and cultivating practices of information-gathering rather than helping. It would focus on accountability rather than conformity. It would calibrate itself directly to the task of redistributing social resources and power rather than to intermediary goals cashed out in terms of pedestals or symbolism. It would focus on building and rebuilding rooms, not regulating traffic within and between them – it would be a world-making project: aimed at building and rebuilding actual structures of social connection and movement, rather than mere critique of the ones we already have.
[...]
A constructive epistemology cannot guarantee full victory over an oppressive system by itself. No epistemic orientation can by itself undo the various power asymmetries between the people and the imperial state system. But it can help make the game a little more competitive – and deference epistemology isn’t even playing.
[...]
When it comes down to it, the thing I believe most deeply about deference epistemology is that it asks something of trauma that it cannot give. Demanding as the constructive approach may be, the deferential approach is far more demanding and in a far more unfair way: it asks the traumatized to shoulder burdens alone that we ought to share collectively.
This last point in particular is especially relevant to the sensitive issue of "working through" traumatic experience. I do not mean to rely too heavily on Freud's application of the term exclusively to the victim of trauma—indeed, I am of the opinion that the collective trauma of a marginalized group is intimately connected to a certain trauma on behalf of the perpetrator, even though this may not be formally recognized (see: toxic masculinity's destruction of the male psyche as well as its obvious harm to women, or Hegel's lord–bondsman dialectic in The Phenomenology of Spirit). But I would argue that genuinely successful progressive movements are never one-sided affairs, necessarily including all involved parties; one must engage with both the marginalized and non-marginalized to effect real societal change. Lacking the cooperation of the second group, their adoption of relevant societal adjustments will be perceived as a matter of imposition rather than choice—regardless of the validity of the work in question—and will therefore be ineffective. If nothing else, constantly deferring to the work of marginalized groups rather than doing such work oneself creates something of a distance that, if not in active opposition to the end-goals of said groups, is subject to diluting their endeavors for the reason that being distant means being apathetic. I like the way the author ends the article because it offers a succinct yet powerful alternative to the deferential approach to standpoint epistemology: "After a long discussion, I answered Helen’s offer with a proposal: why don’t we write something together?"
This is an excellent paper that serves to highlight some of the ways in which progressive "deference epistemology" often fails to accomplish its fundamental telos, for the reason that the "room" in which one making such a deference is situated is most likely going to be filled with other people for whom such an epistemology is inherently only partially applicable; and therefore a truly meaningful deference to the intended epistemology of marginalization in question is not possible. i.e. without taking intersectional theory into account, implementing deferential standpoint theory (positionality) is an insufficient way to ensure that the most "authentic" experience is the one being told in the "outsized" Rooms Where It Matters (so to speak), because a single element of one's positionality only describes a part of their identity. I believe that this is an important commentary to make in an academic environment where progressives are interested in addressing social issues by means of diversifying the speakers on their soapboxes. By recognizing when it is and is not meaningful to defer to a given person, activists are less likely to be led to the "elite capture" spoken about in the article. The necessity of such a careful implementation of deference epistemology, however, begs the question of whether such an approach has any value to begin with, lacking present diversity in such spheres. The piece's thesis hones in persuasively on a "constructive approach to putting standpoint epistemology into practice," rather than a deferential one.
Most relevant here is the case of Professor Táíwò (the author) and freelance journalist Helen. She defers in good faith to the voice of Táíwò, who carries a marginalized identity but who is also privileged in other ways. However, she does so with the assumption that, because of said marginalized identity, Táíwò is therefore "a marginalized person,"—as though one is, as an entire person, either marginalized or not marginalized—ignoring the reality of his position. Therefore, Helen is not in fact allowing for the ideally authentic experiential scene to be painted, but rather encouraging a somewhat unrepresentative member of a marginalized group to speak for that group. Certainly the experience of a racially marginalized person in such matters where it is relevant is preferable to some extent than that of someone completely lacking in such a perspective, even if the professor's economic background does not extend this marginalization to the point assumed by Helen. I would very much argue, for example, that the classist undertones in much of Virginia Woolf's work do not wholly invalidate her significance to the feminist literary canon. But, as the author lays out, beyond the obvious problem of not addressing a marginalized group's lack of representation, poorly informed manifestations of epistemic deference have the added problem of actively misrepresenting said group. Just as one would be at fault in using Woolf to singularly represent "the feminine perspective of the early 20th century," as that category implicitly contains persons of whom Woolf is not representative, Táíwò's Blackness ought not overshadow his status as a tenure-track professor from a family that he describes as being relatively privileged.
Táíwò's comparison of this phenomenon to trickle-down economics is jarring to an academic left traditionally in disdain of such theories, and I think that it is for that reason that it particularly struck me.
Scathing. I suppose that this excerpt also speaks to the gap that exists between academic elites and "the real world"—perhaps a mile in length, it may as well be a light-year in perspective. For instance, progressive student groups engaging in academically informed political activism at universities are often criticized for the "irrelevancy" of their ideas to "actually marginalized people"; i.e. critics argue that academia is a bubble offering unrepresentative solutions by and for unrepresentative members of marginalized groups. Depending on the circumstances, this may not be an unreasonable characterization. But it may also miss the intended audience of such discourse altogether, which is the relatively privileged set of students enrolled at the institution.
To this point, of significance in Táíwò's article is the caveat that "those in powerful rooms may be “elites” relative to the larger group they represent, but this guarantees nothing about how they are treated in the rooms they are in." This is where I feel the issue of the "deferential approach to standpoint epistemology" is substantially less relevant. In providing meta-criticism on, for example, an academic institution's mistreatment of its racially marginalized but economically non-marginalized faculty, only the first characteristic is of note. Compared to faculty who are non-marginalized in both of the above categories—all other factors being equal, for the sake of argument—any form of epistemological deference is valid by default. In an environment where its systemic failings are not applicable, of course it still serves to provide a more representative platform for marginalized groups. As the professor puts it, "Deference epistemology responds to real, morally weighty experiences of being put down, ignored, sidelined, or silenced. It thus has an important non-epistemic appeal to members of stigmatized or marginalized groups: it intervenes directly in morally consequential practices of giving attention and respect."
But despite its defensible raison d'être, the real point Táíwò is making is not just about fine-tuning our implementation of deferential standpoint epistemology in future attempts to diversify the room. Such an approach can be effective in "creating an accurate representation of trauma," but implicitly shifts the burden of activism to the marginalized, and the marginalized alone. He suggests that we avoid this "abdication of responsibility" on behalf of the non-marginalized that is prompted by deference epistemology by instead taking a more active role in social advocacy.
[...]
[...]
This last point in particular is especially relevant to the sensitive issue of "working through" traumatic experience. I do not mean to rely too heavily on Freud's application of the term exclusively to the victim of trauma—indeed, I am of the opinion that the collective trauma of a marginalized group is intimately connected to a certain trauma on behalf of the perpetrator, even though this may not be formally recognized (see: toxic masculinity's destruction of the male psyche as well as its obvious harm to women, or Hegel's lord–bondsman dialectic in The Phenomenology of Spirit). But I would argue that genuinely successful progressive movements are never one-sided affairs, necessarily including all involved parties; one must engage with both the marginalized and non-marginalized to effect real societal change. Lacking the cooperation of the second group, their adoption of relevant societal adjustments will be perceived as a matter of imposition rather than choice—regardless of the validity of the work in question—and will therefore be ineffective. If nothing else, constantly deferring to the work of marginalized groups rather than doing such work oneself creates something of a distance that, if not in active opposition to the end-goals of said groups, is subject to diluting their endeavors for the reason that being distant means being apathetic. I like the way the author ends the article because it offers a succinct yet powerful alternative to the deferential approach to standpoint epistemology: "After a long discussion, I answered Helen’s offer with a proposal: why don’t we write something together?"