Just going to put this here as it’s somewhat relevant to this discussion: @vektor @nacho How would NATO respond to use of chemical/biological/tactical nuclear weapons? Book in question is “The...
Just going to put this here as it’s somewhat relevant to this discussion: @vektor@nacho
I think a major deliberation in those war games is that NATO outguns and outnumbers Russia enormously, and a single nuke isn't sufficient to change that. Basically, that tactical nuclear strike...
I think a major deliberation in those war games is that NATO outguns and outnumbers Russia enormously, and a single nuke isn't sufficient to change that. Basically, that tactical nuclear strike serves mostly as posturing: that they're willing to use nukes. Call their bluff and see if they go for mutual suicide by firing off strategic weapons. The rational answer is of course no.
Though of course there's always the chance that Russia would use tactical nukes at scale. That's much more likely to cause NATO real pain, and much more likely to necessitate a counter strike. Not using nukes to counter a limited tactical use might embolden them to use more tactical nukes. That's of course no good. Another alternative not discussed on those pages might be to strike naval targets: It fits the bill in terms of posturing, "we're willing to counter nukes with nukes", while also not escalating unnecessarily. A target with fewer civilians is unlikely to be found. How that works on the international stage in terms of the sanctions they're talking about, I don't know.
Yea I agree. What's bizarre to me is that in the second game with the principals, they decided the best course of action was to nuke someone not even involved in the conflict?! I mean I understand...
Yea I agree. What's bizarre to me is that in the second game with the principals, they decided the best course of action was to nuke someone not even involved in the conflict?! I mean I understand the logic behind it but everything else about it is awful and I think conventional escalation against a small yield warhead makes way more sense.
An interesting overview of American nuclear posture as well of those of its peers. The whole document is interesting but there's a couple sections on Russia (page 8, page 30) and it's frightening...
An interesting overview of American nuclear posture as well of those of its peers. The whole document is interesting but there's a couple sections on Russia (page 8, page 30) and it's frightening escalate to de-escalate nuclear strategy.
Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons. It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to “de-escalate” a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect for dangerous miscalculation and escalation.
...
Most concerning are Russia’s national security policies, strategy, and doctrine that include an emphasis on the threat of limited nuclear escalation, and its continuing development and fielding of increasingly diverse and expanding nuclear capabilities. Moscow threatens and exercises limited nuclear first use, suggesting a mistaken expectation that coercive nuclear threats or limited first use could paralyze the United States and NATO and thereby end a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Some in the United States refer to this as Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine. “De-escalation” in this sense follows from Moscow’s mistaken assumption of Western capitulation on terms favorable to Moscow.
Effective U.S. deterrence of Russian nuclear attack and non-nuclear strategic attack now requires ensuring that the Russian leadership does not miscalculate regarding the consequences of limited nuclear first use, either regionally or against the United States itself. Russia must instead understand that nuclear first-use, however limited, will fail to achieve its objectives, fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, and trigger incalculable and intolerable costs for Moscow. Our strategy will ensure Russia understands that any use of nuclear weapons, however limited, is unacceptable.
This morning in the House Intel Hearing the Defense Intelligence Agency is quoted as saying: I think questions of nuclear deterrence regarding a tactical nuclear first strike are unanswered at...
This morning in the House Intel Hearing the Defense Intelligence Agency is quoted as saying:
Russia pursuing escalate to de-escalate doctrine, has invested heavily in tactical nuclear weapons and US should "maybe take him at his word."
I think questions of nuclear deterrence regarding a tactical nuclear first strike are unanswered at this point. From the linked review:
Russia must instead understand that nuclear first-use, however limited, will fail to achieve its objectives, fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, and trigger incalculable and intolerable costs for Moscow.
How the United States conveys this is important and why you need to withhold additional sanctions/responses to prevent further escalation.
To me there's a clear moral line you have to cross to use nuclear force. It goes way beyond any economic sanctions. I (maybe naively) assume that for a number of people and countries (including...
How the United States conveys this is important and why you need to withhold additional sanctions/responses to prevent further escalation.
To me there's a clear moral line you have to cross to use nuclear force. It goes way beyond any economic sanctions. I (maybe naively) assume that for a number of people and countries (including China) that crossing the nuclear line will isolate Russia so thoroughly that the option isn't on the table.
China has lots of experience dealing with these sorts of issues in its dealings with North Korea. That makes me feel safer because I believe the chances for an accidental nuclear disaster are smaller as a result of China's dealings with North Korea over the years.
Why should we blame the West for escalating the situation, when Russia is literally invading another country?
Can any non-violent, non-military response to a military invasion ever be viewed as an escalation of the situation? (Sure there's digital sabotage and other hybrid warfare I'd argue are military responses)
Absolutely, I think it would make Russia into a nation non grata. Which I think illustrates why we can't exercise that option at this point, even though some would like to.
To me there's a clear moral line you have to cross to use nuclear force. It goes way beyond any economic sanctions. I (maybe naively) assume that for a number of people and countries (including China) that crossing the nuclear line will isolate Russia so thoroughly that the option isn't on the table.
Absolutely, I think it would make Russia into a nation non grata. Which I think illustrates why we can't exercise that option at this point, even though some would like to.
Article in FA from a very qualified expert on what this war means for current arms control efforts and nuclear proliferation. Personally I’m skeptical of this not starting a nuclear arms race, but...
Article in FA from a very qualified expert on what this war means for current arms control efforts and nuclear proliferation. Personally I’m skeptical of this not starting a nuclear arms race, but I guess we’ll see. I think non-nuclear middle powers with perceived 'hostile' neighbours are looking at this conflict with unease.
Relevant article by Christopher Chivvis (Former Sr. US Intel Official) in The Guardian. I'm not sure how 'real' the risks of nuclear escalation are (real in the sense of how likely they are to...
Relevant article by Christopher Chivvis (Former Sr. US Intel Official) in The Guardian.
war games conducted for the US and allied governments and my own experience as the US national intelligence officer for Europe suggest that if we boil it down, there are really only two paths toward ending the war: one, continued escalation, potentially across the nuclear threshold; the other, a bitter peace imposed on a defeated Ukraine that will be extremely hard for the United States and many European allies to swallow.
...
Scores of war games carried out by the United States and its allies in the wake of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine make it clear that Putin would probably use a nuclear weapon if he concludes that his regime is threatened.
...
a more likely option would be a sudden nuclear test or a high-altitude nuclear detonation that damages the electrical grid over a major Ukrainian or even Nato city. Think of an explosion that makes the lights go out over Oslo.
I'm not sure how 'real' the risks of nuclear escalation are (real in the sense of how likely they are to occur, the risk is always non-zero) but keep in mind part of an effective deterrent in democracies may include priming and steeling public resolve, potentially through articles such as this one.
Also, keep in mind that these war games might be scoped in such a way as to deliberately exclude certain real-world situations: Do they model the situation on the (Russian) home front? Do they...
Also, keep in mind that these war games might be scoped in such a way as to deliberately exclude certain real-world situations: Do they model the situation on the (Russian) home front? Do they include the occupation phase of Ukraine? Sanctions? Because if I modeled Afghanistan 2001 at the level of detail and abstraction of a real-time strategy game, I'd say the Taliban have not a whiff of a chance, but here we are.
It's also entirely possible this article is not just designed to "steel public resolve": It implicitly calls for escalation, painting the only portrayed alternative as a tough pill to swallow.
And then he turns around and tears down that perspective as well and calls it hawkish. Damn, really not sure what to think of it. I guess in the end the bottom line is that we might have to get ready to accept this bitter pill.
Just going to put this here as it’s somewhat relevant to this discussion: @vektor @nacho
How would NATO respond to use of chemical/biological/tactical nuclear weapons? Book in question is “The Bomb” by Fred Kaplan and some screenshots are posted of the details of a war game in which Russia’s escalate-to-deescalate” doctrine is gamed against.
I think a major deliberation in those war games is that NATO outguns and outnumbers Russia enormously, and a single nuke isn't sufficient to change that. Basically, that tactical nuclear strike serves mostly as posturing: that they're willing to use nukes. Call their bluff and see if they go for mutual suicide by firing off strategic weapons. The rational answer is of course no.
Though of course there's always the chance that Russia would use tactical nukes at scale. That's much more likely to cause NATO real pain, and much more likely to necessitate a counter strike. Not using nukes to counter a limited tactical use might embolden them to use more tactical nukes. That's of course no good. Another alternative not discussed on those pages might be to strike naval targets: It fits the bill in terms of posturing, "we're willing to counter nukes with nukes", while also not escalating unnecessarily. A target with fewer civilians is unlikely to be found. How that works on the international stage in terms of the sanctions they're talking about, I don't know.
Yea I agree. What's bizarre to me is that in the second game with the principals, they decided the best course of action was to nuke someone not even involved in the conflict?! I mean I understand the logic behind it but everything else about it is awful and I think conventional escalation against a small yield warhead makes way more sense.
An interesting overview of American nuclear posture as well of those of its peers. The whole document is interesting but there's a couple sections on Russia (page 8, page 30) and it's frightening escalate to de-escalate nuclear strategy.
This morning in the House Intel Hearing the Defense Intelligence Agency is quoted as saying:
I think questions of nuclear deterrence regarding a tactical nuclear first strike are unanswered at this point. From the linked review:
How the United States conveys this is important and why you need to withhold additional sanctions/responses to prevent further escalation.
To me there's a clear moral line you have to cross to use nuclear force. It goes way beyond any economic sanctions. I (maybe naively) assume that for a number of people and countries (including China) that crossing the nuclear line will isolate Russia so thoroughly that the option isn't on the table.
China has lots of experience dealing with these sorts of issues in its dealings with North Korea. That makes me feel safer because I believe the chances for an accidental nuclear disaster are smaller as a result of China's dealings with North Korea over the years.
Why should we blame the West for escalating the situation, when Russia is literally invading another country?
Can any non-violent, non-military response to a military invasion ever be viewed as an escalation of the situation? (Sure there's digital sabotage and other hybrid warfare I'd argue are military responses)
Absolutely, I think it would make Russia into a nation non grata. Which I think illustrates why we can't exercise that option at this point, even though some would like to.
Article in FA from a very qualified expert on what this war means for current arms control efforts and nuclear proliferation. Personally I’m skeptical of this not starting a nuclear arms race, but I guess we’ll see. I think non-nuclear middle powers with perceived 'hostile' neighbours are looking at this conflict with unease.
Relevant article by Christopher Chivvis (Former Sr. US Intel Official) in The Guardian.
I'm not sure how 'real' the risks of nuclear escalation are (real in the sense of how likely they are to occur, the risk is always non-zero) but keep in mind part of an effective deterrent in democracies may include priming and steeling public resolve, potentially through articles such as this one.
Also, keep in mind that these war games might be scoped in such a way as to deliberately exclude certain real-world situations: Do they model the situation on the (Russian) home front? Do they include the occupation phase of Ukraine? Sanctions? Because if I modeled Afghanistan 2001 at the level of detail and abstraction of a real-time strategy game, I'd say the Taliban have not a whiff of a chance, but here we are.
It's also entirely possible this article is not just designed to "steel public resolve": It implicitly calls for escalation, painting the only portrayed alternative as a tough pill to swallow.
And then he turns around and tears down that perspective as well and calls it hawkish. Damn, really not sure what to think of it. I guess in the end the bottom line is that we might have to get ready to accept this bitter pill.