In my view, Ukraine and the West need to take this upcoming opportunity to sue for peace on relatively favorable grounds rather than squander it in a war of attrition they will likely lose. I...
Ukraine has a six-month window in which to seize the battlefield initiative from Russia and strengthen its hand for peace talks, a senior commander told Reuters, predicting a "turning point" was imminent after more than four years of war.
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President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said last week Ukraine had retaken nearly 600 square km (230 square miles) of territory in 2026. Reuters could not independently verify the figure. Moscow currently controls almost one-fifth of Ukrainian territory.
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Biletsky said it was too early to draw conclusions from Kyiv's recent success, but that Ukraine could capitalise on it by continuing mid-range attacks and advancing "carefully".
In my view, Ukraine and the West need to take this upcoming opportunity to sue for peace on relatively favorable grounds rather than squander it in a war of attrition they will likely lose. I think a reasonable model for this war from beginning to end is like the inverse of the stock market: there are up and down fluctuations, but there's a clear long-term downward trend. Ukraine is approaching a local maximum and needs to take it and run.
People are naturally risk averse, which is to say that they overcompensate for downside risk. There's a logic to this instinct in that a purely random bad luck streak, if it goes on for long...
People are naturally risk averse, which is to say that they overcompensate for downside risk. There's a logic to this instinct in that a purely random bad luck streak, if it goes on for long enough, can prevent you from being able to continue to "play the game" and win back your losses. Even if, by the Russian government's calculations, the theory and data primarily point to the conclusion that things will fluctuate but over time Russia will make gains, there's some risk that there's real momentum behind the gains Ukraine is making and one would expect Russia to overcompensate for that risk in negotiations.
I dunno tbh. Their negotiations will be far better informed on war goals and hidden information than us. These will be professionals backed by the power of states - political scientists, analysts,...
I dunno tbh. Their negotiations will be far better informed on war goals and hidden information than us. These will be professionals backed by the power of states - political scientists, analysts, military specialists.
I doubt they'll be compulsive in the face of grand-scheme insignificant fluctuations like these into making impulsive decisions in negotiations that will take months.
Risk aversion is when you discount the expected value of a gamble when making a decision. If I sold you the right to play a game of chance, where there was a one in a quadrillion chance of winning...
Risk aversion is when you discount the expected value of a gamble when making a decision. If I sold you the right to play a game of chance, where there was a one in a quadrillion chance of winning a quintillion dollars, and if you were will unwilling to buy it at $999 (which, under risk neutral behavior, would be a deal since expected value is $1000) then, formally, you would be risk averse. As noted, risk aversion is not irrational and is a natural consequence of being unable to "play a game" enough times in order tighten the probability distribution around its expected value. In practice, we often regard behavior that's only slightly risk averse as bold (imagine if someone you knew was willing to play that game for $990), so I believe that this facet of decision making in the face of uncertainty will definitely help Ukraine in negotiations regardless.
In my view, Ukraine and the West need to take this upcoming opportunity to sue for peace on relatively favorable grounds rather than squander it in a war of attrition they will likely lose. I think a reasonable model for this war from beginning to end is like the inverse of the stock market: there are up and down fluctuations, but there's a clear long-term downward trend. Ukraine is approaching a local maximum and needs to take it and run.
Won't that calculus be baked into both sides negotiating anyway, and thus kind of cancel itself out?
People are naturally risk averse, which is to say that they overcompensate for downside risk. There's a logic to this instinct in that a purely random bad luck streak, if it goes on for long enough, can prevent you from being able to continue to "play the game" and win back your losses. Even if, by the Russian government's calculations, the theory and data primarily point to the conclusion that things will fluctuate but over time Russia will make gains, there's some risk that there's real momentum behind the gains Ukraine is making and one would expect Russia to overcompensate for that risk in negotiations.
I dunno tbh. Their negotiations will be far better informed on war goals and hidden information than us. These will be professionals backed by the power of states - political scientists, analysts, military specialists.
I doubt they'll be compulsive in the face of grand-scheme insignificant fluctuations like these into making impulsive decisions in negotiations that will take months.
Risk aversion is when you discount the expected value of a gamble when making a decision. If I sold you the right to play a game of chance, where there was a one in a quadrillion chance of winning a quintillion dollars, and if you were will unwilling to buy it at $999 (which, under risk neutral behavior, would be a deal since expected value is $1000) then, formally, you would be risk averse. As noted, risk aversion is not irrational and is a natural consequence of being unable to "play a game" enough times in order tighten the probability distribution around its expected value. In practice, we often regard behavior that's only slightly risk averse as bold (imagine if someone you knew was willing to play that game for $990), so I believe that this facet of decision making in the face of uncertainty will definitely help Ukraine in negotiations regardless.
I see that trend too, but perhaps they could hold out until something new shakes things up? Suppose Putin dies?