Blocking Russia from the internet would've ultimately done more harm than good. It's because of the internet, the people within the country can see and hear news beyond what the state dictates
Blocking Russia from the internet would've ultimately done more harm than good. It's because of the internet, the people within the country can see and hear news beyond what the state dictates
I'm not sure about this argument. Russia seems to be on the way to block every website they don't like, so at some point anything ICANN might block is no longer doing anything to their access to...
I'm not sure about this argument. Russia seems to be on the way to block every website they don't like, so at some point anything ICANN might block is no longer doing anything to their access to neutral information but it's still harming their economy in the same way sanctions do--and preventing their government from using the internet as a tool themselves. In this scenario, russians seeking free information must use VPNs either way.
But ICANN shouldn't block Russia because that's something ICANN must absolutely never do to anyone. It's fundamentally contrary to their purpose.
I think these are both true. I'm unsure about one thing, though: Wouldn't an ICANN "block" of Russia be able to prevent even VPN use? They administrate more than just the DNS, right? They also...
It's because of the internet, the people within the country can see and hear news beyond what the state dictates
ICANN shouldn't block Russia because that's something ICANN must absolutely never do to anyone. It's fundamentally contrary to their purpose.
I think these are both true.
I'm unsure about one thing, though: Wouldn't an ICANN "block" of Russia be able to prevent even VPN use? They administrate more than just the DNS, right? They also manage regional address ranges, don't they?
Could the address from which a Russian user would connect to their foreign VPN service make them vulnerable to an ICANN "block" preventing the connection to the VPN? I don't quite remember enough from my web dev days I'm afraid...
Honestly, I'm not sure what ICANN, itself, could do to "block" any particular IP block; most of their responsibilities lie in coordinating between domain registrars, the five Regional Internet...
Honestly, I'm not sure what ICANN, itself, could do to "block" any particular IP block; most of their responsibilities lie in coordinating between domain registrars, the five Regional Internet Registries, and the IETF. In theory, ICANN could ask RIPE NCC to revoke allocations it's given to Russia, but even that would just be a formal way of asking the rest of the world to stop accepting routing announcements (through BGP) from Russian backbone routers, at the exchange points in Warsaw, Bratislava (or, realistically, Vienna), Bucharest, Sofia, and various cities in China and Japan, and globally throughout the various satellite and even POTS-based/dialup channels.
If those exchanges complied, this would mean that Russia's view of the internet would become extremely strange. Initially, traffic out of Russia would largely work, but routers that are configured to prevent source IP spoofing would start dropping previously legitimate traffic, and essentially zero packets would make their way back across the Russian border. As BGP announcements from across the border began to expire, huge portions of IP space would start to vanish, and eventually Russia and whatever rogue exchanges still advertised to them would be all that was left. From the outside, routes would start going down and traffic would begin taking longer, lower-bandwidth routes, until eventually it would look as if Russia's entire IP space had simply vanished, probably over just a few minutes or an hour - not so different from the results of a total and devastating nuclear attack.
EDIT: If I were a nation state and I wanted to disconnect Russia from the rest of the world, frankly, I wouldn't ask ICANN; I'd depth charge the RJCN, the Polar Express at the Vladivostok end, BCS North Phase 2 from Kotka to Logi, the Kaliningrad Cable, and the Georgia-Russia cable on both segments. They'd still have access, but it would be deeply chaotic and very low-bandwidth.
This is my opinion exactly. IANA's power comes from the voluntary compliance of the involved parties. Even BGP level measures have their problems, since I'd expect to see a lot of fighting back in...
This is my opinion exactly. IANA's power comes from the voluntary compliance of the involved parties. Even BGP level measures have their problems, since I'd expect to see a lot of fighting back in the form of Russia-originated disruption in that case. To cut someone out of the internet you snip cables, which of course would likely be interpreted as an act of war, or legally coerce networks and exchanges to disconnect Russia's backbones and stop peering with their services.
When I said "anything ICANN might block" I did mean logistically disrupting the .ru TLD and the like. VPN use is unaffected.
Blocking Russia from the internet would've ultimately done more harm than good. It's because of the internet, the people within the country can see and hear news beyond what the state dictates
I'm not sure about this argument. Russia seems to be on the way to block every website they don't like, so at some point anything ICANN might block is no longer doing anything to their access to neutral information but it's still harming their economy in the same way sanctions do--and preventing their government from using the internet as a tool themselves. In this scenario, russians seeking free information must use VPNs either way.
But ICANN shouldn't block Russia because that's something ICANN must absolutely never do to anyone. It's fundamentally contrary to their purpose.
I think these are both true.
I'm unsure about one thing, though: Wouldn't an ICANN "block" of Russia be able to prevent even VPN use? They administrate more than just the DNS, right? They also manage regional address ranges, don't they?
Could the address from which a Russian user would connect to their foreign VPN service make them vulnerable to an ICANN "block" preventing the connection to the VPN? I don't quite remember enough from my web dev days I'm afraid...
Honestly, I'm not sure what ICANN, itself, could do to "block" any particular IP block; most of their responsibilities lie in coordinating between domain registrars, the five Regional Internet Registries, and the IETF. In theory, ICANN could ask RIPE NCC to revoke allocations it's given to Russia, but even that would just be a formal way of asking the rest of the world to stop accepting routing announcements (through BGP) from Russian backbone routers, at the exchange points in Warsaw, Bratislava (or, realistically, Vienna), Bucharest, Sofia, and various cities in China and Japan, and globally throughout the various satellite and even POTS-based/dialup channels.
If those exchanges complied, this would mean that Russia's view of the internet would become extremely strange. Initially, traffic out of Russia would largely work, but routers that are configured to prevent source IP spoofing would start dropping previously legitimate traffic, and essentially zero packets would make their way back across the Russian border. As BGP announcements from across the border began to expire, huge portions of IP space would start to vanish, and eventually Russia and whatever rogue exchanges still advertised to them would be all that was left. From the outside, routes would start going down and traffic would begin taking longer, lower-bandwidth routes, until eventually it would look as if Russia's entire IP space had simply vanished, probably over just a few minutes or an hour - not so different from the results of a total and devastating nuclear attack.
EDIT: If I were a nation state and I wanted to disconnect Russia from the rest of the world, frankly, I wouldn't ask ICANN; I'd depth charge the RJCN, the Polar Express at the Vladivostok end, BCS North Phase 2 from Kotka to Logi, the Kaliningrad Cable, and the Georgia-Russia cable on both segments. They'd still have access, but it would be deeply chaotic and very low-bandwidth.
This is my opinion exactly. IANA's power comes from the voluntary compliance of the involved parties. Even BGP level measures have their problems, since I'd expect to see a lot of fighting back in the form of Russia-originated disruption in that case. To cut someone out of the internet you snip cables, which of course would likely be interpreted as an act of war, or legally coerce networks and exchanges to disconnect Russia's backbones and stop peering with their services.
When I said "anything ICANN might block" I did mean logistically disrupting the .ru TLD and the like. VPN use is unaffected.
Relevant (from the linked timestamp up til 42:00 or so).