I hope they eventually compile that information into a blog post or something like that. Twitter is a terrible way to disseminate in-depth information.
I hope they eventually compile that information into a blog post or something like that. Twitter is a terrible way to disseminate in-depth information.
I agree (in fact, when I first saw this was a Twitter link, I was surprised by how much info there was). The Defcon 25 voting machine hacking village referenced in a tweet created a report that...
I agree (in fact, when I first saw this was a Twitter link, I was surprised by how much info there was).
The Defcon 25 voting machine hacking village referenced in a tweet created a report that seems to have quite a bit of information. I'm not super knowledgeable in this stuff, but I'm definitely planning on giving it a read.
The Defcon report is indeed quite interesting. I find it remarkable that Diebold is still in this business. They've been hacked before and haven't learned a thing it seems. Edit: They aren't,...
The Defcon report is indeed quite interesting. I find it remarkable that Diebold is still in this business. They've been hacked before and haven't learned a thing it seems.
Edit: They aren't, anymore. Diebold sold the voting division to Election Systems & Software. They have a similar track record.
I wonder, is there any initiatives focused on building an open source voting machine? That would seem to be the only way you could possibly come up with a device that is sufficiently hardened...
I wonder, is there any initiatives focused on building an open source voting machine? That would seem to be the only way you could possibly come up with a device that is sufficiently hardened enough to be usable, if that's even possible.
There is absolutely no reason that any voting machine used should not print out a human-readable paper ballot form, which can be read by the person who voted, and deposit it in a secure ballot...
There is absolutely no reason that any voting machine used should not print out a human-readable paper ballot form, which can be read by the person who voted, and deposit it in a secure ballot box. In all cases, a verification count of these paper ballots should be required. If this is done, it doesn't matter if the machines were hacked, because the paper ballots will show correctly to the person who voted, and auditing will catch any fraud on the part of the machine count.
Voting is the basis of our entire system, and it is a solved problem. There is no reason for trusting only the electronic machines' count, and the auditable paper trail is a necessary and simple way to verify the accuracy of the results. Anyone arguing the costs for manual recounts are too high should consider what having democracy is worth in the first place.
I hope they eventually compile that information into a blog post or something like that. Twitter is a terrible way to disseminate in-depth information.
I agree (in fact, when I first saw this was a Twitter link, I was surprised by how much info there was).
The Defcon 25 voting machine hacking village referenced in a tweet created a report that seems to have quite a bit of information. I'm not super knowledgeable in this stuff, but I'm definitely planning on giving it a read.
The Defcon report is indeed quite interesting. I find it remarkable that Diebold is still in this business. They've been hacked before and haven't learned a thing it seems.
Edit: They aren't, anymore. Diebold sold the voting division to Election Systems & Software. They have a similar track record.
Original Hacker News discussion (there's some pretty good discussion there).
Fuck man, that's crazy. I didn't think the machines had been hacked initially, but I'm less sure now
I wonder, is there any initiatives focused on building an open source voting machine? That would seem to be the only way you could possibly come up with a device that is sufficiently hardened enough to be usable, if that's even possible.
There is absolutely no reason that any voting machine used should not print out a human-readable paper ballot form, which can be read by the person who voted, and deposit it in a secure ballot box. In all cases, a verification count of these paper ballots should be required. If this is done, it doesn't matter if the machines were hacked, because the paper ballots will show correctly to the person who voted, and auditing will catch any fraud on the part of the machine count.
Voting is the basis of our entire system, and it is a solved problem. There is no reason for trusting only the electronic machines' count, and the auditable paper trail is a necessary and simple way to verify the accuracy of the results. Anyone arguing the costs for manual recounts are too high should consider what having democracy is worth in the first place.