“No, no,” said Frankie, “it’s the brain we want to buy.” “What!” “Well, who would miss it?” inquired Benjy. “I thought you said you could just read his brain electronically,” protested Ford. “Oh...
“No, no,” said Frankie, “it’s the brain we want to buy.”
“What!”
“Well, who would miss it?” inquired Benjy.
“I thought you said you could just read his brain electronically,” protested Ford.
“Oh yes,” said Frankie, “but we’d have to get it out first. It’s got to be prepared.”
“Treated,” said Benjy.
“Diced.”
“Thank you,” shouted Arthur, tipping up his chair and backing away from the table in horror.
“It could always be replaced,” said Benjy reasonably, “if you think it’s important.”
“Yes, an electronic brain,” said Frankie, “a simple one would suffice.”
“A simple one!” wailed Arthur.
“Yeah,” said Zaphod with a sudden evil grin, “you’d just have to program it to say What? and I don’t understand and Where’s the tea? Who’d know the difference?”
“What?” cried Arthur, backing away still farther.
“See what I mean?” said Zaphod, and howled with pain because of something that Trillian did at that moment.
“I’d notice the difference,” said Arthur.
“No, you wouldn’t,” said Frankie mouse, “you’d be programmed not to.”
I highly suggest everyone to read the book Virtually Human by Martine Rothblatt. Talks on this very subject, I can't stress just how future forward she is in real life, and in her books. Mind...
I highly suggest everyone to read the book Virtually Human by Martine Rothblatt. Talks on this very subject, I can't stress just how future forward she is in real life, and in her books. Mind uploading (or cloning) I believe will happen, sooner rather than later and this book really solidified that thoughr process for me.
It's fun to think about, but it seems near impossible to guess when or if anything like functional mind uploading will happen. Before we could even start working on the herculean task of fully...
It's fun to think about, but it seems near impossible to guess when or if anything like functional mind uploading will happen.
Before we could even start working on the herculean task of fully copying a mind, we'd first need to completely understand how the brain works. We're not even close enough to that point to speculate how far away it might be.
What even is a mind? We know that neurons are widely distributed throughout the body, 500 million (recently up from 100 million, we have no idea yet) in the gut alone, and that experience is not produced solely in the brain. There are also hormones and other neurotransmitters to consider. Variables which evolve and change throughout a life, alongside the brain in our skull. It could turn out that once we figured out how to tease all the pieces of self and memory out of the brain, we'd still be missing vital parts of the person's sense of "I".
It's a fantastic narrative driver in sci fi in any case.
I disagree. While I think understanding the mind is helpful, I don't think relying on it as a basis for a recreation is required. We wouldn't recreate the way a tree grows just to have more paper...
Before we could even start working on the herculean task of fully copying a mind, we'd first need to completely understand how the brain works.
I disagree. While I think understanding the mind is helpful, I don't think relying on it as a basis for a recreation is required. We wouldn't recreate the way a tree grows just to have more paper - instead we would find how to create the pulp without growing the tree. The brain has millions of years of cruft, evolutionary dead ends, and is painfully not as efficient as it should be because of it. Tech debt and brain debt both derive from the same formulaic iterative processes, both are terribly inefficient.
we'd still be missing vital parts of the person's sense of "I".
What is an "I"? the "I" of myself five minutes ago is different than the "I" of myself five years ago. I don't subscribe to the belief that there is a concept of consciousness, we are all just a form of in-depth simulacra of what we perceive could be us, a method to understand the madness of the chaotic causality of the mind. Reality is subjective to the users experience, my green is your yellow, my blue is your red, we can't determine what an "I" is if we can't determine what the true reality is on its own.
The brain has created a wonderful mechanism for SDRs (I wrote briefly on this here), where what we see and hear, and then negotiate with ourselves with what what we perceive are essentially a tarball that has been so compressed that the real true values are encrypted even from ourselves by using simpler and simpler calls of generalization.
I don't believe we will ever "upload" a mind but we will clone them. Cloning them requires less evolutionary cruft, more enhancement, faster iterations than evolution can ever do for it/ourselves. Creating a simulacra that is similar enough to our own existing mindscape is the goal, a method of transferring the basis of our personality, experiences, opinions, but not the 1:1 connections. Brains are fallible, prone to error on the smallest of things, with no real ability to change or upgrade (on the contrary, tends to degrade steadily and rapidly).
Uploading ones mind isn't, or shouldn't be the goal, there are too many problems at home. Cloning a mind? Creating the ability to create decision matrixes based on prior experiences at a 75-90% similarity rate of the human subject? That is the goal. If you places two of yourselves at this moment at a table, and asked it a question, would they answer the exact same? Or would they have minor changes? Likely the latter where the minor changes are due to the different position they are resting in, if they are to the left or right of "you", distance to the nearest wall, distance to the question giver or table, a breeze they feel but is blocked from "you". The goal shouldn't be to upload a mind, the goal should be to clone it with a similar enough decision tree that at inception they are mostly the same, and then every moment afterwards is rapidly different as a feature, not a bug.
I think we maybe just have different ideas about the complexity of brains. I do think digitizing the mind is possible, I just think it's probably a very long way off. I used "I" as shorthand for a...
I think we maybe just have different ideas about the complexity of brains. I do think digitizing the mind is possible, I just think it's probably a very long way off.
I used "I" as shorthand for a sense of self that was consistent enough that the person being uploaded (or cloned if you like) would find their new home familiar enough that they wouldn't be unsatisfied or even go insane.
I was imagining that the killer application for mind uploading would be life extension. For (ethically fraught) research purpose I could see a high error rate copy being useful.
Discussions of "uploading" consciousness seems to always bump up against the same contradictions derived from our metaphysical assumptions of the mind. For example, the process of "uploading"...
Discussions of "uploading" consciousness seems to always bump up against the same contradictions derived from our metaphysical assumptions of the mind. For example, the process of "uploading" consciousness is almost certainly one that wouldn't be destructive to the brain being uploaded. After uploading, you'd have two "minds" (one in the machine, one in the human) that claim to be the legitimate successor of the upload event. Would we be satisfied with this divergence? This would be of little comfort to the mind inside the human who exists post-upload, who does not feel that the mind in the machine is a true continuation of their own. This is setting aside problems associated with the difference between organic and artificial consciousness.
Regardless of how troublesome the way we view the continuity of our mind might be, it seems that the reason we'd want to "upload our consciousness" is because we feel that our consciousness (our essential selves) have a lifelong continuity that will end at death, and we wish to preserve this perceived continuity indefinitely, something that doesn't even seem to work in thought experiments.
It seems to me that the property of being unique is valuable to most people. In any case, an uploaded mind would diverge very quickly due to its unique circumstances.
It seems to me that the property of being unique is valuable to most people.
In any case, an uploaded mind would diverge very quickly due to its unique circumstances.
Exactly. The human who uploaded their consciousness could never feel as though they are the ones who are uploaded because...well they aren't. The idea that one day I may upload my mind to a...
Exactly. The human who uploaded their consciousness could never feel as though they are the ones who are uploaded because...well they aren't. The idea that one day I may upload my mind to a computer before I die and continue living seem unimaginable to me. Maybe an artificial mind can emulate my mind, but in my view my mind can't escape my death.
I might think of my uploaded mind as something that, while not me, is intrinsically related to myself and a form of continuation. Kinda like a son or a daughter. To be honest, I would be concerned...
I might think of my uploaded mind as something that, while not me, is intrinsically related to myself and a form of continuation. Kinda like a son or a daughter.
To be honest, I would be concerned with the possibility of my uploaded mind diverging so deeply from my moral principles that it might become something I'd consider evil in the long run. What if my uploaded mind diverged enough to become genocidal 300 years from now?
This is just my opinion, but I think as we tend to get older, we become more risk-adverse and reactionary towards any structural or societal changes ("the rebellious kids these days and the music...
This is just my opinion, but I think as we tend to get older, we become more risk-adverse and reactionary towards any structural or societal changes ("the rebellious kids these days and the music they listen to.") I think if people typically lived to be 150-200 years old then either there'd be absolutely no tolerance of any change from the status quo, or society would simply grind to a halt.
When we die, we give space to the next generation both materially and in the public square. To be a human is to be ephemeral; I think it's better to embrace that fact and make the most of the time we have, while ready to pass the baton. So much time and effort is wasted in the fruitless effort to either be permanent or to have a permanent impact that could be spent making the here and now a richer, more meaningful experience. Or maybe I'm just the fun police lol
You're correct, but an uploaded mind would behave in highly unpredictable ways. This is not the same as living to be 300. The mere fact that a mind is now in a virtual world introduces such a...
You're correct, but an uploaded mind would behave in highly unpredictable ways. This is not the same as living to be 300. The mere fact that a mind is now in a virtual world introduces such a radical change in perspective that they might become irrecognizable quicker than we thing. Uploaded @lou might be basically an entirely new person 24 hours after upload.
Edit: the show Altered Carbon touches on the issues you bring concerning longevity and/or immortality.
Without digging too deep into metaphysical questions I'm not knowledgeable to weigh in on, it seems any strong deviation after upload would be an indicator that maybe there was a failure to upload...
Without digging too deep into metaphysical questions I'm not knowledgeable to weigh in on, it seems any strong deviation after upload would be an indicator that maybe there was a failure to upload a human mind. Maybe being a human mind is contingent on certain organic structures, systems, and methods of perception that aren't sufficiently replicated in this scenario.
Even if you assume that the upload was perfect and complete, the environment to which you were uploaded would not be the same. Suppose you are now immortal and unbounded by the constraints of a...
Even if you assume that the upload was perfect and complete, the environment to which you were uploaded would not be the same. Suppose you are now immortal and unbounded by the constraints of a physical body. Wouldn't your outlook on life radically change?
Forget mind upload, think about becoming a vampire. Who would remain the same?
Yeah, it is the scifi version of the soul leaving the body and going to heaven/hades/afterlife. I do not believe it would be possible beyond maybe perhaps duplicating some subset of your memories...
Regardless of how troublesome the way we view the continuity of our mind might be, it seems that the reason we'd want to "upload our consciousness" is because we feel that our consciousness (our essential selves) have a lifelong continuity that will end at death, and we wish to preserve this perceived continuity indefinitely, something that doesn't even seem to work in thought experiments.
Yeah, it is the scifi version of the soul leaving the body and going to heaven/hades/afterlife.
I do not believe it would be possible beyond maybe perhaps duplicating some subset of your memories in a different entity. I'm no expert on the matter but I don't think it makes sense unless you have a strong believe in mind-body separation.
“No, no,” said Frankie, “it’s the brain we want to buy.”
“What!”
“Well, who would miss it?” inquired Benjy.
“I thought you said you could just read his brain electronically,” protested Ford.
“Oh yes,” said Frankie, “but we’d have to get it out first. It’s got to be prepared.”
“Treated,” said Benjy.
“Diced.”
“Thank you,” shouted Arthur, tipping up his chair and backing away from the table in horror.
“It could always be replaced,” said Benjy reasonably, “if you think it’s important.”
“Yes, an electronic brain,” said Frankie, “a simple one would suffice.”
“A simple one!” wailed Arthur.
“Yeah,” said Zaphod with a sudden evil grin, “you’d just have to program it to say What? and I don’t understand and Where’s the tea? Who’d know the difference?”
“What?” cried Arthur, backing away still farther.
“See what I mean?” said Zaphod, and howled with pain because of something that Trillian did at that moment.
“I’d notice the difference,” said Arthur.
“No, you wouldn’t,” said Frankie mouse, “you’d be programmed not to.”
My favorite fiction about this topic:
I highly suggest everyone to read the book Virtually Human by Martine Rothblatt. Talks on this very subject, I can't stress just how future forward she is in real life, and in her books. Mind uploading (or cloning) I believe will happen, sooner rather than later and this book really solidified that thoughr process for me.
It's fun to think about, but it seems near impossible to guess when or if anything like functional mind uploading will happen.
Before we could even start working on the herculean task of fully copying a mind, we'd first need to completely understand how the brain works. We're not even close enough to that point to speculate how far away it might be.
What even is a mind? We know that neurons are widely distributed throughout the body, 500 million (recently up from 100 million, we have no idea yet) in the gut alone, and that experience is not produced solely in the brain. There are also hormones and other neurotransmitters to consider. Variables which evolve and change throughout a life, alongside the brain in our skull. It could turn out that once we figured out how to tease all the pieces of self and memory out of the brain, we'd still be missing vital parts of the person's sense of "I".
It's a fantastic narrative driver in sci fi in any case.
I disagree. While I think understanding the mind is helpful, I don't think relying on it as a basis for a recreation is required. We wouldn't recreate the way a tree grows just to have more paper - instead we would find how to create the pulp without growing the tree. The brain has millions of years of cruft, evolutionary dead ends, and is painfully not as efficient as it should be because of it. Tech debt and brain debt both derive from the same formulaic iterative processes, both are terribly inefficient.
What is an "I"? the "I" of myself five minutes ago is different than the "I" of myself five years ago. I don't subscribe to the belief that there is a concept of consciousness, we are all just a form of in-depth simulacra of what we perceive could be us, a method to understand the madness of the chaotic causality of the mind. Reality is subjective to the users experience, my green is your yellow, my blue is your red, we can't determine what an "I" is if we can't determine what the true reality is on its own.
The brain has created a wonderful mechanism for SDRs (I wrote briefly on this here), where what we see and hear, and then negotiate with ourselves with what what we perceive are essentially a tarball that has been so compressed that the real true values are encrypted even from ourselves by using simpler and simpler calls of generalization.
I don't believe we will ever "upload" a mind but we will clone them. Cloning them requires less evolutionary cruft, more enhancement, faster iterations than evolution can ever do for it/ourselves. Creating a simulacra that is similar enough to our own existing mindscape is the goal, a method of transferring the basis of our personality, experiences, opinions, but not the 1:1 connections. Brains are fallible, prone to error on the smallest of things, with no real ability to change or upgrade (on the contrary, tends to degrade steadily and rapidly).
Uploading ones mind isn't, or shouldn't be the goal, there are too many problems at home. Cloning a mind? Creating the ability to create decision matrixes based on prior experiences at a 75-90% similarity rate of the human subject? That is the goal. If you places two of yourselves at this moment at a table, and asked it a question, would they answer the exact same? Or would they have minor changes? Likely the latter where the minor changes are due to the different position they are resting in, if they are to the left or right of "you", distance to the nearest wall, distance to the question giver or table, a breeze they feel but is blocked from "you". The goal shouldn't be to upload a mind, the goal should be to clone it with a similar enough decision tree that at inception they are mostly the same, and then every moment afterwards is rapidly different as a feature, not a bug.
I think we maybe just have different ideas about the complexity of brains. I do think digitizing the mind is possible, I just think it's probably a very long way off.
I used "I" as shorthand for a sense of self that was consistent enough that the person being uploaded (or cloned if you like) would find their new home familiar enough that they wouldn't be unsatisfied or even go insane.
I was imagining that the killer application for mind uploading would be life extension. For (ethically fraught) research purpose I could see a high error rate copy being useful.
Discussions of "uploading" consciousness seems to always bump up against the same contradictions derived from our metaphysical assumptions of the mind. For example, the process of "uploading" consciousness is almost certainly one that wouldn't be destructive to the brain being uploaded. After uploading, you'd have two "minds" (one in the machine, one in the human) that claim to be the legitimate successor of the upload event. Would we be satisfied with this divergence? This would be of little comfort to the mind inside the human who exists post-upload, who does not feel that the mind in the machine is a true continuation of their own. This is setting aside problems associated with the difference between organic and artificial consciousness.
Regardless of how troublesome the way we view the continuity of our mind might be, it seems that the reason we'd want to "upload our consciousness" is because we feel that our consciousness (our essential selves) have a lifelong continuity that will end at death, and we wish to preserve this perceived continuity indefinitely, something that doesn't even seem to work in thought experiments.
It seems to me that the property of being unique is valuable to most people.
In any case, an uploaded mind would diverge very quickly due to its unique circumstances.
Exactly. The human who uploaded their consciousness could never feel as though they are the ones who are uploaded because...well they aren't. The idea that one day I may upload my mind to a computer before I die and continue living seem unimaginable to me. Maybe an artificial mind can emulate my mind, but in my view my mind can't escape my death.
I might think of my uploaded mind as something that, while not me, is intrinsically related to myself and a form of continuation. Kinda like a son or a daughter.
To be honest, I would be concerned with the possibility of my uploaded mind diverging so deeply from my moral principles that it might become something I'd consider evil in the long run. What if my uploaded mind diverged enough to become genocidal 300 years from now?
This is just my opinion, but I think as we tend to get older, we become more risk-adverse and reactionary towards any structural or societal changes ("the rebellious kids these days and the music they listen to.") I think if people typically lived to be 150-200 years old then either there'd be absolutely no tolerance of any change from the status quo, or society would simply grind to a halt.
When we die, we give space to the next generation both materially and in the public square. To be a human is to be ephemeral; I think it's better to embrace that fact and make the most of the time we have, while ready to pass the baton. So much time and effort is wasted in the fruitless effort to either be permanent or to have a permanent impact that could be spent making the here and now a richer, more meaningful experience. Or maybe I'm just the fun police lol
You're correct, but an uploaded mind would behave in highly unpredictable ways. This is not the same as living to be 300. The mere fact that a mind is now in a virtual world introduces such a radical change in perspective that they might become irrecognizable quicker than we thing. Uploaded @lou might be basically an entirely new person 24 hours after upload.
Edit: the show Altered Carbon touches on the issues you bring concerning longevity and/or immortality.
Without digging too deep into metaphysical questions I'm not knowledgeable to weigh in on, it seems any strong deviation after upload would be an indicator that maybe there was a failure to upload a human mind. Maybe being a human mind is contingent on certain organic structures, systems, and methods of perception that aren't sufficiently replicated in this scenario.
Even if you assume that the upload was perfect and complete, the environment to which you were uploaded would not be the same. Suppose you are now immortal and unbounded by the constraints of a physical body. Wouldn't your outlook on life radically change?
Forget mind upload, think about becoming a vampire. Who would remain the same?
That's an interesting point. Maybe the constraints of mortality and a physical body are necessary elements of what it means to be human?
Now you're deep in transhumanist territory ;)
I guess that's gonna give me a rabbit hole to go down lol
Yeah, it is the scifi version of the soul leaving the body and going to heaven/hades/afterlife.
I do not believe it would be possible beyond maybe perhaps duplicating some subset of your memories in a different entity. I'm no expert on the matter but I don't think it makes sense unless you have a strong believe in mind-body separation.