I hate how it seems like religion, despite being one of the only chosen protected classes, always seems to get elevated above others when it comes into conflict. I guess I should be grateful that...
I hate how it seems like religion, despite being one of the only chosen protected classes, always seems to get elevated above others when it comes into conflict. I guess I should be grateful that they didn't completely gut LGBT protections, but this still rubs me the wrong way.
I'd guess that's pretty natural in an orignialist's evaluation: it's easy to forget how important absolute religious freedom was to a lot of people who literally fled Europe to go to the US. That...
I'd guess that's pretty natural in an orignialist's evaluation: it's easy to forget how important absolute religious freedom was to a lot of people who literally fled Europe to go to the US. That persisted well into the mid 20th century.
I'd assume court precedents follow that standard in large.
The supreme court's opinion can be found online. To me, the ruling seems fine. They ruled that because he was only unwilling to sell wedding cakes, and was still willing to sell various other...
To me, the ruling seems fine. They ruled that because he was only unwilling to sell wedding cakes, and was still willing to sell various other baked goods, it was a legitimate religious complaint, not discrimination against gay people. The committee investigating his decision to not sell the cake initially also called his religion beliefs "most despicable pieces of rhetoric", which is not what you want from a committee investigation wether something is a valid religious objection.
I don’t think the ruling actually says that. As far as I can tell the ruling is only really about the second part you mentioned: they say the Commission violated Phillips’ free exercise rights by...
it was a legitimate religious complaint, not discrimination against gay people.
I don’t think the ruling actually says that. As far as I can tell the ruling is only really about the second part you mentioned: they say the Commission violated Phillips’ free exercise rights by acting with undue hostility. Ginsburg’s dissent seems to be centered on showing that this is not true in the legal sense that would make the Commission’s actions a violation of the 1st amendment.
The question of whether Phillips was actually discriminating (he obviously was), whether wedding cakes are a form of speech, or whether his free exercise rights give him exemptions to anti-discrimination laws, were explicitly not addressed, which is what makes this a “narrow” ruling. You might think of this ruling as analogous to granting Phillips a mistrial due to the Commission’s behavior, without saying much about how a similar fact pattern would be resolved another time—if I’m reading this correctly of course.
My skimming led me to not seeing just how right you were in focusing on the commission's comments as the basis for this ruling. I sometimes forget that the Supreme Court likes to punt on all...
My skimming led me to not seeing just how right you were in focusing on the commission's comments as the basis for this ruling. I sometimes forget that the Supreme Court likes to punt on all issues it can whenever it can. Thanks for this comment.
I've been long frustrated with this particular case. As far as rights cases are concerned, I think the baker's case was stronger and that in popular opinion this could easily swing against what...
I've been long frustrated with this particular case. As far as rights cases are concerned, I think the baker's case was stronger and that in popular opinion this could easily swing against what has long been a steady creep of lgbt+ rights closer to actual equality. Just about every rights-based advocacy organization looks for good cases to support to push their view of legal jurisprudence, and this case was always stronger for conservatives.
Hell, I agree with the ruling. The commission's comments do seem to show prejudice against Phillips. More than that, I buy the argument that the wedding cakes Phillips makes are art. And forcing artists to use their art in ways they personally disagree with is not great. It'd have been another thing if this were a total denial of service (as the article points out). Instead this was the limited statement "I don't feel comfortable using my art to speak that way."
I've been concerned for a while with using the judicial branch to move forward rights issues that are now getting popular enough to advance legislatively in many areas. It feels like the sort of run-around that could lead to another Roe v. Wade counter-reaction that stops progress and hardens reactionary opposition.
By this same argument, the owner of a cake shop cannot refuse to make a cake that has a swastika and slurs about jews on it. I believe that someone should be able to refuse to create something...
By this same argument, the owner of a cake shop cannot refuse to make a cake that has a swastika and slurs about jews on it. I believe that someone should be able to refuse to create something based on their beliefs. He still would sell other forms of cakes to them, which to me is enough to make it reasonable.
Sure he can. When you make a cake with something like a swastika, you are showing support for a specific political idea, and we assume political cakes is not what time man normally makes. What...
Sure he can. When you make a cake with something like a swastika, you are showing support for a specific political idea, and we assume political cakes is not what time man normally makes. What this man does, however, offer is wedding cakes; and that's all this couple requested. Imagine if this man went to a Muslim baker who refused to sell him a cake because he didn't want to be see endorsing a Christian marriage, and then think what the church's response would be. If he is uncomfortable offering wedding cakes to all members of the public on the legally required equal grounds he is required to uphold, he shouldn't offer wedding cakes. Period.
You make a good point. I guess we shall see how the court rules in the case that actually matters, where the main distinction is not the committee initially decided was clearly discriminating. I...
You make a good point. I guess we shall see how the court rules in the case that actually matters, where the main distinction is not the committee initially decided was clearly discriminating. I suspect your opinion is the opinion the court will take, perhaps is a 5-4 or 6-3 vote.
Regardless of what direction was ruled, one protected class would have had to trump another. I believe the distinction the court made was that the baker was not refusing to serve them because they...
Regardless of what direction was ruled, one protected class would have had to trump another.
I believe the distinction the court made was that the baker was not refusing to serve them because they were gay but instead because it was for a gay wedding specifically. It was not blanket discrimination against people for being gay, it was refusing to show his support for a forma of marriage he did not believe in.
I hate how it seems like religion, despite being one of the only chosen protected classes, always seems to get elevated above others when it comes into conflict. I guess I should be grateful that they didn't completely gut LGBT protections, but this still rubs me the wrong way.
I'd guess that's pretty natural in an orignialist's evaluation: it's easy to forget how important absolute religious freedom was to a lot of people who literally fled Europe to go to the US. That persisted well into the mid 20th century.
I'd assume court precedents follow that standard in large.
The supreme court's opinion can be found online.
To me, the ruling seems fine. They ruled that because he was only unwilling to sell wedding cakes, and was still willing to sell various other baked goods, it was a legitimate religious complaint, not discrimination against gay people. The committee investigating his decision to not sell the cake initially also called his religion beliefs "most despicable pieces of rhetoric", which is not what you want from a committee investigation wether something is a valid religious objection.
I don’t think the ruling actually says that. As far as I can tell the ruling is only really about the second part you mentioned: they say the Commission violated Phillips’ free exercise rights by acting with undue hostility. Ginsburg’s dissent seems to be centered on showing that this is not true in the legal sense that would make the Commission’s actions a violation of the 1st amendment.
The question of whether Phillips was actually discriminating (he obviously was), whether wedding cakes are a form of speech, or whether his free exercise rights give him exemptions to anti-discrimination laws, were explicitly not addressed, which is what makes this a “narrow” ruling. You might think of this ruling as analogous to granting Phillips a mistrial due to the Commission’s behavior, without saying much about how a similar fact pattern would be resolved another time—if I’m reading this correctly of course.
My skimming led me to not seeing just how right you were in focusing on the commission's comments as the basis for this ruling. I sometimes forget that the Supreme Court likes to punt on all issues it can whenever it can. Thanks for this comment.
I've been long frustrated with this particular case. As far as rights cases are concerned, I think the baker's case was stronger and that in popular opinion this could easily swing against what has long been a steady creep of lgbt+ rights closer to actual equality. Just about every rights-based advocacy organization looks for good cases to support to push their view of legal jurisprudence, and this case was always stronger for conservatives.
Hell, I agree with the ruling. The commission's comments do seem to show prejudice against Phillips. More than that, I buy the argument that the wedding cakes Phillips makes are art. And forcing artists to use their art in ways they personally disagree with is not great. It'd have been another thing if this were a total denial of service (as the article points out). Instead this was the limited statement "I don't feel comfortable using my art to speak that way."
I've been concerned for a while with using the judicial branch to move forward rights issues that are now getting popular enough to advance legislatively in many areas. It feels like the sort of run-around that could lead to another Roe v. Wade counter-reaction that stops progress and hardens reactionary opposition.
By this same argument, the owner of a cake shop cannot refuse to make a cake that has a swastika and slurs about jews on it. I believe that someone should be able to refuse to create something based on their beliefs. He still would sell other forms of cakes to them, which to me is enough to make it reasonable.
But there is a difference between a couple wanting a cake for their wedding and hate speech being put on a cake.
Sure he can. When you make a cake with something like a swastika, you are showing support for a specific political idea, and we assume political cakes is not what time man normally makes. What this man does, however, offer is wedding cakes; and that's all this couple requested. Imagine if this man went to a Muslim baker who refused to sell him a cake because he didn't want to be see endorsing a Christian marriage, and then think what the church's response would be. If he is uncomfortable offering wedding cakes to all members of the public on the legally required equal grounds he is required to uphold, he shouldn't offer wedding cakes. Period.
You make a good point. I guess we shall see how the court rules in the case that actually matters, where the main distinction is not the committee initially decided was clearly discriminating. I suspect your opinion is the opinion the court will take, perhaps is a 5-4 or 6-3 vote.
Regardless of what direction was ruled, one protected class would have had to trump another.
I believe the distinction the court made was that the baker was not refusing to serve them because they were gay but instead because it was for a gay wedding specifically. It was not blanket discrimination against people for being gay, it was refusing to show his support for a forma of marriage he did not believe in.