Unless you think organic chemistry is some kind of magical, supernatural thing, then I don't really see how you could possibly think that a lab grown brain couldn't become conscious. In fact, I...
Unless you think organic chemistry is some kind of magical, supernatural thing, then I don't really see how you could possibly think that a lab grown brain couldn't become conscious. In fact, I don't even see a good reason why a billion marbles carefully arranged in the desert according to a clever list of instructions couldn't become "conscious" if you gave it enough time.
Edit: I'd like to clarify, because a lab grown brain would be the result of organic chemistry. I guess the broader point I'm trying to make is it's not really possible to know if anything but you is conscious, and it seems pretty dicey, ethically speaking, to assume we could possibly intentionally avoid creating a consciousness with certainty.
For what it’s worth I both believe in the existence of the soul and in the possibility of artificial consciousness. I do have a personal theological explanation for that.
For what it’s worth I both believe in the existence of the soul and in the possibility of artificial consciousness. I do have a personal theological explanation for that.
It has to do with God and efficiency. If God is the very incarnation of all virtues in such a way that cannot be surpassed by any other entity, it stands to reason that God is infinitely...
It has to do with God and efficiency.
If God is the very incarnation of all virtues in such a way that cannot be surpassed by any other entity, it stands to reason that God is infinitely efficient. With that in mind, why wouldn’t god give a soul/conscience/whatever to something that is perfectly suited to have one?
A perfectly efficient God wouldn't create a metaphysical aspect of consciousness (a soul) if it wasn't necessary. And certainly everything we know so far implies that all we need for consciousness...
A perfectly efficient God wouldn't create a metaphysical aspect of consciousness (a soul) if it wasn't necessary. And certainly everything we know so far implies that all we need for consciousness is already present in our biology.
The concept of a soul made more sense when we understood neurobiology less. It was easier to imagine that something was missing, that consciousness was too grand a thing to be produced exclusively by our brain.
But now the concept of a soul seems to be purely a mythological answer to mortality. You need something separate from the body to house identity if you hope to imagine that identity survives death.
Not that I begrudge anyone their souls :) And I recognize that it's not a topic with a lot of potential for useful discourse.
I’m somewhat of a weirdo, because I agree with everything you say and still believe in the existence of the soul — and not in some mythological way. But proselytizing is boring so let’s leave it...
I’m somewhat of a weirdo, because I agree with everything you say and still believe in the existence of the soul — and not in some mythological way. But proselytizing is boring so let’s leave it at that.
Neither you nor @mrbig have defined what efficiency means yet with relation to God. All current definitions are in relation to finite processes, it's unclear how that definition extends to...
Neither you nor @mrbig have defined what efficiency means yet with relation to God. All current definitions are in relation to finite processes, it's unclear how that definition extends to something infinite. Things are usually efficient with regards to a goal, so at minimum there has to be a stated goal for God for the word efficient to make sense,
For those who are interested, this view is known as functionalism. One variant of functionalism is that the consciousness is the result of a complicated state machine, which is what I assume bloup...
For those who are interested, this view is known as functionalism.
One variant of functionalism is that the consciousness is the result of a complicated state machine, which is what I assume bloup subscribes to given his marble analogy.
An issue (in my mind) with this, is given anything sufficiently complicated, like a large pile of bricks, you could define states as collections of thermo-dynamic microstates of the bricks. Then, with a good enough definition, you could, for a few seconds, get the appropriate transitions that a conscious minimal state machine would require.
As a result Boltzman brains are present everywhere. (Just the brains, not the whole thought experiment.) Further, your brain could be composed of multiple consciousnesses at the same time, however only one is causally effective - controlling your limbs.
This isn't a contradiction, but in my opinion it seems unlikely. One escape is to insist on a causal connection, but that quickly brings you into the realm of panpsychism.
The issue is not that we want to define what consciousness is. Instead, we should try to define what morally significant consciousness is. With my example of a pile of bricks., kicking it over creates as many conscious entities as it destroys, which isn't very helpful. I tend to agree with Chalmers about the hardness of defining it. I haven't finished his book yet, so, for now, I'm pretty sure I'll disagree with his solution.
I largely agree with what you are saying. However, I do want to mention that I think we have actually come up with some pretty satisfying definitions for what life is, for example, the...
I largely agree with what you are saying. However, I do want to mention that I think we have actually come up with some pretty satisfying definitions for what life is, for example, the thermodynamic definition of life. In case you aren't familiar, by the thermodynamic definition of life, something is considered to be "alive" if it is both simultaneously capable of
Maintaining a low entropy state that is not in equilibrium with its surroundings
Replicating itself
Also, personally I feel like viruses should not be considered to be "alive". I'm definitely no virus expert, and maybe the two you have mentioned can't be described this way (and I'm definitely interested in learning what it is about these two viruses that made you identify them specifically), but I've never heard of a virus that can do either one on their own, so by the thermodynamic definition of life, they should not be considered to be alive. And even without this definition of life, a virus is really nothing more than some DNA or RNA strands inside of a protein package.
Advancements like this make it very clear the importance of philosophy as a means to supply possible responses to future scenarios. It is not uncommon to read in places like Tildes and Hacker News...
Advancements like this make it very clear the importance of philosophy as a means to supply possible responses to future scenarios. It is not uncommon to read in places like Tildes and Hacker News that philosophy is something of a subpar intelectual effort, but philosophy of science and bioethics are essencial to navigate the existential implications of scientific progress.
I think every system is probably 'conscious' in some way or another. A rock or some other solid piece of matter is probably on the lower end of the spectrum, and brains, with their incredibly...
I think every system is probably 'conscious' in some way or another. A rock or some other solid piece of matter is probably on the lower end of the spectrum, and brains, with their incredibly large number of interconnected parts are probably on the higher end of the spectrum. There is probably some qualia experienced by a computer, or a government, or a bug that is significantly different than a human's qualia. In this imagined system, the main differentiating factor between different consciousnesses is the level of interactions between them, so the reason your brain is one consciousness and not ten different consciousnesses is because of the high level of interconnectedness.
I believe this because the alternative would be some special property of brain matter that gives it consciousness, but not other systems, or some speed limit that restricts consciousness to things that can think 'fast' enough. I think that consciousness just being a generic emergent property of systems is the simplest and most generic solution.
I really like the essay "If Materialism Is True, the United States Is Probably Conscious", which talks about exactly this.
Unless you think organic chemistry is some kind of magical, supernatural thing, then I don't really see how you could possibly think that a lab grown brain couldn't become conscious. In fact, I don't even see a good reason why a billion marbles carefully arranged in the desert according to a clever list of instructions couldn't become "conscious" if you gave it enough time.
Edit: I'd like to clarify, because a lab grown brain would be the result of organic chemistry. I guess the broader point I'm trying to make is it's not really possible to know if anything but you is conscious, and it seems pretty dicey, ethically speaking, to assume we could possibly intentionally avoid creating a consciousness with certainty.
For what it’s worth I both believe in the existence of the soul and in the possibility of artificial consciousness. I do have a personal theological explanation for that.
It has to do with God and efficiency.
If God is the very incarnation of all virtues in such a way that cannot be surpassed by any other entity, it stands to reason that God is infinitely efficient. With that in mind, why wouldn’t god give a soul/conscience/whatever to something that is perfectly suited to have one?
I’m not a philosopher, but that’s how it goes.
A perfectly efficient God wouldn't create a metaphysical aspect of consciousness (a soul) if it wasn't necessary. And certainly everything we know so far implies that all we need for consciousness is already present in our biology.
The concept of a soul made more sense when we understood neurobiology less. It was easier to imagine that something was missing, that consciousness was too grand a thing to be produced exclusively by our brain.
But now the concept of a soul seems to be purely a mythological answer to mortality. You need something separate from the body to house identity if you hope to imagine that identity survives death.
Not that I begrudge anyone their souls :) And I recognize that it's not a topic with a lot of potential for useful discourse.
I’m somewhat of a weirdo, because I agree with everything you say and still believe in the existence of the soul — and not in some mythological way. But proselytizing is boring so let’s leave it at that.
Neither you nor @mrbig have defined what efficiency means yet with relation to God. All current definitions are in relation to finite processes, it's unclear how that definition extends to something infinite. Things are usually efficient with regards to a goal, so at minimum there has to be a stated goal for God for the word efficient to make sense,
I’m afraid you guys are taking my little internal logic way more seriously than it’s worth :P
For those who are interested, this view is known as functionalism.
One variant of functionalism is that the consciousness is the result of a complicated state machine, which is what I assume bloup subscribes to given his marble analogy.
An issue (in my mind) with this, is given anything sufficiently complicated, like a large pile of bricks, you could define states as collections of thermo-dynamic microstates of the bricks. Then, with a good enough definition, you could, for a few seconds, get the appropriate transitions that a conscious minimal state machine would require.
As a result Boltzman brains are present everywhere. (Just the brains, not the whole thought experiment.) Further, your brain could be composed of multiple consciousnesses at the same time, however only one is causally effective - controlling your limbs.
This isn't a contradiction, but in my opinion it seems unlikely. One escape is to insist on a causal connection, but that quickly brings you into the realm of panpsychism.
The issue is not that we want to define what consciousness is. Instead, we should try to define what morally significant consciousness is. With my example of a pile of bricks., kicking it over creates as many conscious entities as it destroys, which isn't very helpful. I tend to agree with Chalmers about the hardness of defining it. I haven't finished his book yet, so, for now, I'm pretty sure I'll disagree with his solution.
I largely agree with what you are saying. However, I do want to mention that I think we have actually come up with some pretty satisfying definitions for what life is, for example, the thermodynamic definition of life. In case you aren't familiar, by the thermodynamic definition of life, something is considered to be "alive" if it is both simultaneously capable of
Also, personally I feel like viruses should not be considered to be "alive". I'm definitely no virus expert, and maybe the two you have mentioned can't be described this way (and I'm definitely interested in learning what it is about these two viruses that made you identify them specifically), but I've never heard of a virus that can do either one on their own, so by the thermodynamic definition of life, they should not be considered to be alive. And even without this definition of life, a virus is really nothing more than some DNA or RNA strands inside of a protein package.
Advancements like this make it very clear the importance of philosophy as a means to supply possible responses to future scenarios. It is not uncommon to read in places like Tildes and Hacker News that philosophy is something of a subpar intelectual effort, but philosophy of science and bioethics are essencial to navigate the existential implications of scientific progress.
I agree, philosophy has a place. More power to any form of intellectual curiosity, in this political climate more than ever!
I think every system is probably 'conscious' in some way or another. A rock or some other solid piece of matter is probably on the lower end of the spectrum, and brains, with their incredibly large number of interconnected parts are probably on the higher end of the spectrum. There is probably some qualia experienced by a computer, or a government, or a bug that is significantly different than a human's qualia. In this imagined system, the main differentiating factor between different consciousnesses is the level of interactions between them, so the reason your brain is one consciousness and not ten different consciousnesses is because of the high level of interconnectedness.
I believe this because the alternative would be some special property of brain matter that gives it consciousness, but not other systems, or some speed limit that restricts consciousness to things that can think 'fast' enough. I think that consciousness just being a generic emergent property of systems is the simplest and most generic solution.
I really like the essay "If Materialism Is True, the United States Is Probably Conscious", which talks about exactly this.