12 votes

Hackers can steal cryptographic keys by video-recording power LEDs sixty feet away

5 comments

  1. [2]
    ianw
    Link
    I remember something like from a few years ago! If I remember correctly, that situation was a really niche use case. it would need to be a scenario where you need to get data from an airgapped...

    I remember something like from a few years ago! If I remember correctly, that situation was a really niche use case. it would need to be a scenario where you need to get data from an airgapped system where you:

    1. are running arbitrary code on the attack target already
    2. have a line of sight to the hard drive/power LED

    Still a super cool proof of concept, same with this one.

    6 votes
    1. Jessica
      Link Parent
      I remember that! It was super fascinating and it blows me away how clever people can be. Here is the research paper for it.

      I remember that! It was super fascinating and it blows me away how clever people can be.

      Here is the research paper for it.

      3 votes
  2. [2]
    blink
    Link
    Pretty incredible stuff that this is even possible. There are some major restrictions, though: Meaning someone is swiping a card or similar for 65 minutes straight. Or you're running code on the...

    Pretty incredible stuff that this is even possible. There are some major restrictions, though:

    When the camera is 60 feet away, the room lights must be turned off, but they can be turned on if the surveillance camera is at a distance of about 6 feet. (An attacker can also use an iPhone to record the smart card reader power LED.) The video must be captured for 65 minutes, during which the reader must constantly perform the operation.

    Meaning someone is swiping a card or similar for 65 minutes straight. Or you're running code on the device already.

    edit: Though it's unclear to me whether those 65 minutes can be accumulated over a long period of time.

    3 votes
    1. NaraVara
      Link Parent
      I'm thinking specifically of govt. PIV/CAC cards which is the example here. Really the only operation the reader does is authenticate the token on the card. It takes a couple of seconds. The only...

      I'm thinking specifically of govt. PIV/CAC cards which is the example here. Really the only operation the reader does is authenticate the token on the card. It takes a couple of seconds. The only way to get 65 minutes of that would be to constantly have the device try to authenticate you and not just use the token that will have been cached on your system when you started that session.

      If they can splice it together that's probably doable but only if you have access to the building's security camera feed. You'd need to be collecting a LOT of footage over many many days.

      1 vote
  3. NaraVara
    Link
    Put your useless laptop webcam covers on your card reader's LED light from now on instead I guess?

    Put your useless laptop webcam covers on your card reader's LED light from now on instead I guess?

    2 votes