See also previous discussion here and here. From the article: Details of the proposed frameworks are linked in the article. Among the noteworthy details is that this process uses existing...
See also previous discussion here and here. From the article:
Essentially, Apple and Google have built an automated contact-tracing system. It’s different from conventional contact-tracing, and probably most useful when combined with conventional methods. Most importantly, it can operate at a far greater scale than conventional contact tracing, which will be necessary given how far the outbreak has spread in most countries. Because it’s coming from Apple and Google, some of this functionality will also eventually be built in to Android and iPhones at an OS-level. That makes this technical solution potentially available to more than three billion phones around the world — something that would be impossible otherwise.
It’s important to note that what Apple and Google are working on together is a framework and not an app. They’re handling the plumbing and guaranteeing the privacy and security of the system, but leaving the building of the actual apps that use it to others.
HOW DOES IT WORK?
In basic terms, this system lets your phone log other phones that have been nearby. As long as this system is running, your phone will periodically blast out a small, unique, and anonymous piece of code, derived from that phone’s unique ID. Other phones in range receive that code and remember it, building up a log of the codes they’ve received and when they received them.
Details of the proposed frameworks are linked in the article. Among the noteworthy details is that this process uses existing Bluetooth Beacon technology. It tracks the bare minimum of data - only other IDs within a previously specified radius. As described, the framework appears to follow most, but not all, of the privacy recommendations from the Chaos Computer Club. In particular, the framework presumes use of a central ID database.
I have grave doubts that the source code will be released, and serious concerns that once the firmware is updated, it may be possible to activate the beacons remotely and involuntarily, turning phones into the modern equivalent of leper's bells.
Deliberate/accident seems like a false binary here? That was essentially an intern who wasn't thinking, combined with a team that wasn't thinking either. It may be hard to believe in hindsight,...
Deliberate/accident seems like a false binary here? That was essentially an intern who wasn't thinking, combined with a team that wasn't thinking either. It may be hard to believe in hindsight, but they didn't expect that logging random unencrypted WiFi data would be quite so bad. The best word for this is negligent. And negligence is, indeed, how a lot of bad things happen.
The same sort of thing is less likely now because it's not 2012 anymore. Google started a pretty rigorous system of privacy review as a result of that incident in particular.
The specs for the coronavirus proposal are being published and a lot of security analysts are looking at it. That's entirely intentional. I doubt we're going to see any real surprises. We're going to see disagreement over what's an acceptable risk.
There's certainly a risk that people will collect the bluetooth ID's emitted from these phones and try to correlate them with people who report that they've tested positive. How bad is it? Hard to say in advance.
It seems likely to me that many people, having tested positive, will think about where they've been over the last couple of weeks and figure it's an acceptable risk, if the benefit is warning others and preventing more infections. (Others won't think it through, but it will usually be an acceptable risk anyway.)
We can't afford the vast majority of us getting infected. Even stretched out over a much longer period, that still represents a huge number of preventable deaths and massive overload of health...
We can't afford the vast majority of us getting infected. Even stretched out over a much longer period, that still represents a huge number of preventable deaths and massive overload of health systems.
The whole point of contact tracing is that this scenario is preventable. Once the number of infectious carriers has been reduced through isolation and quarantine, the remaining outbreaks can be contained by tracing cases and contacts. We can minimize the suffering and death pending a vaccine.
That might not happen (maybe there will be good news about medical advances), and anyway it's still important to slow the spread because timing matters. Warning other people so they can quarantine...
That might not happen (maybe there will be good news about medical advances), and anyway it's still important to slow the spread because timing matters. Warning other people so they can quarantine (more) will help slow the spread.
It's true that for many of us, there's not that much more we can do, but not everyone is so careful, and they might appreciate a warning so they don't infect their relatives?
I also think it's unhelpful to treat "privacy violation" as a simple abstraction, but instead to think through what the risks are and how much they actually matter. Often, location data is pretty boring and there's no reason not to disclose it. But that's probably easier to judge for individuals who know where they've been.
See also previous discussion here and here. From the article:
Details of the proposed frameworks are linked in the article. Among the noteworthy details is that this process uses existing Bluetooth Beacon technology. It tracks the bare minimum of data - only other IDs within a previously specified radius. As described, the framework appears to follow most, but not all, of the privacy recommendations from the Chaos Computer Club. In particular, the framework presumes use of a central ID database.
I have grave doubts that the source code will be released, and serious concerns that once the firmware is updated, it may be possible to activate the beacons remotely and involuntarily, turning phones into the modern equivalent of leper's bells.
Deliberate/accident seems like a false binary here? That was essentially an intern who wasn't thinking, combined with a team that wasn't thinking either. It may be hard to believe in hindsight, but they didn't expect that logging random unencrypted WiFi data would be quite so bad. The best word for this is negligent. And negligence is, indeed, how a lot of bad things happen.
The same sort of thing is less likely now because it's not 2012 anymore. Google started a pretty rigorous system of privacy review as a result of that incident in particular.
The specs for the coronavirus proposal are being published and a lot of security analysts are looking at it. That's entirely intentional. I doubt we're going to see any real surprises. We're going to see disagreement over what's an acceptable risk.
There's certainly a risk that people will collect the bluetooth ID's emitted from these phones and try to correlate them with people who report that they've tested positive. How bad is it? Hard to say in advance.
It seems likely to me that many people, having tested positive, will think about where they've been over the last couple of weeks and figure it's an acceptable risk, if the benefit is warning others and preventing more infections. (Others won't think it through, but it will usually be an acceptable risk anyway.)
We can't afford the vast majority of us getting infected. Even stretched out over a much longer period, that still represents a huge number of preventable deaths and massive overload of health systems.
The whole point of contact tracing is that this scenario is preventable. Once the number of infectious carriers has been reduced through isolation and quarantine, the remaining outbreaks can be contained by tracing cases and contacts. We can minimize the suffering and death pending a vaccine.
That might not happen (maybe there will be good news about medical advances), and anyway it's still important to slow the spread because timing matters. Warning other people so they can quarantine (more) will help slow the spread.
It's true that for many of us, there's not that much more we can do, but not everyone is so careful, and they might appreciate a warning so they don't infect their relatives?
I also think it's unhelpful to treat "privacy violation" as a simple abstraction, but instead to think through what the risks are and how much they actually matter. Often, location data is pretty boring and there's no reason not to disclose it. But that's probably easier to judge for individuals who know where they've been.
It seems like so far, there is hardly any stigma associated with testing positive. I hope that lasts.