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What does "performative" mean?
Judith Butler has some influential pieces that talk about performative or performativity.
I see online lots of people seem to think there's no difference between "performance" and "performative".
So, in philosophy, what do theyean when they say performative?
Your performance can be performative. Performance is the action, performative is a descriptor of the action. Usually "Performative" refers to a performance that is intended more as a gesture than a meaningful action. It's just going through the motions.
If I behave in accordance with my beliefs, that is performance, no other descriptors are needed. If I behave in a way that doesn't align with my beliefs, solely to satisfy others, it is performative.
It can also be used to describe token actions, things that look bigger than they actually are, "throwing a bone," so to speak, but we're starting to get out of philosophy a bit here.
I have not come across this distinction so much and I find it a bit confusing. Do you have any more references I can consult on this? Is this a distinction Butler makes in her work?
You're confused because I'm lost. I wasn't framing this against Butler, and was trying to avoid gender because, frankly, before trying to figure out a response here I'd never read a word of gender theory and it complicates the explanation. That is completely my bad.
I'm literally reading "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory" as sort of a crash course here, and sincerely hope Butler hasn't had any radical shifts of opinion since 1988.
It took some digging to find Butler slipping and referring to gendered behavior as "performance" specifically, but I'm going to try to deconstruct what they said on paper. On page 11, they stumble just right for me to try to explain myself, and I don't think I'm taking anything out of context here.
"Performance" is just the action.
Honest performance, or I guess factual performance, is purely the result of internal attitudes. Butler uses the word "expression" for this in most of the paper.
"Performative" actions are those done as the result of external attitudes. Particularly with regard to gender, these attitudes have been internalized, and typical forms of gender expression are "performative."
So, I guess to actually be on topic, "performance" requires evaluation, and "performative" is an evaluation of a performance as a signal.
From what I understand of Butler's theories of performativity, albeit quite little, you can only be an identity through the act of preforming the cultural standards of that identity. And the way you perform the performance of your identity, in its self redefines that identity, making that identity performative. That's probably off the mark, I never got into the prerequisite Focault needed to understand Butler's work.
I do know in an economic sense, performative theory states that an economic theory doesn't need to be inherently true, but rather people need to believe that it is true which will result in the theory being true, like a self-fulfilling prophecy.
I take it to mean actions or choices made to satisfy a hegemony in lieu of or irrespective of one's actual beliefs or ethics.
To answer the question directly, something you do as a performance is something that has the characteristic of being performative.
Full disclosure, I am not a philosopher, nor do I have any meaningful level of schooling in philosophy. I'm sure there is nuance I'm missing here.
When Butler talks about performativity, it is the discussion of identity as learned behaviors and social conventions. Specifically, gender identity isn't a natural or pre-existent essential element of who you are. Gender isn't something you are, it is something you do. One doesn't do gender because of some characteristic of themselves that predisposes them to acting a specific way. You do gender because you are socialized to perform a "gender" in society, and this performance is something that is enforced by other folks who both relate to and are a part of the dominant gender culture. Gender exists as an identity as a result of these performances and resultant social and political imaginaries, institutions, and linguistic traditions.
Performativity theory, if summed up in a sentence, would be: We don't perform gender because of our pre-existing identity, rather our identity is the result of the performance of gender.
Performativity theory has sometimes been casually and dishonestly used by some flavors of TERF-ism that use gender abolition (the "undoing of gender") as a pre-text for transphobia. Of course, most performativity theorists have a trans-positive interpretation of performativity theory, namely Butler herself [1]. It's important to know that not everyone agrees with performativity theory. Gender Trouble barely mentions the experiences of trans people at all. It's also important to note that people experience gender in vastly different ways. I'm not really well equipped to dig into which metaphysical frameworks of gender have more merit. Honestly, at least as far as my politics and gender identity go, the metaphysics are largely irrelevant to me.
[1] https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2009-judith-butler-on-gender-and-the-trans-experience-one-should-be-free-to-determine-the-course-of-one-s-gendered-life
I don't read much philosophy (or at least not formal philosophy), but I take it as saying things for some reason other than to convey what you think is true about the world.
(Source)
One reason you might say something without meaning it literally is that you are an actor in a performance, but performative statements go well beyond that. See also jokes, lies, and bullshit (indifference to the truth).
This isn't directly related, but it reminds me that words can be used in all sorts of ways beyond their literal meaning. Here's a quote from Inside the Cells of the Eggplant:
Let me just mention that Judith Butler has a specific theory of gender in mind, but there is a wider philosophical idea of performative utterances, i.e., speech acts. A speech act is roughly one that makes itself come true, e.g. "I assert that you are a murderer!" is, in and of itself, an assertion that the interlocutor is a murderer; "I do" or "I now declare you husband and wife" in the context of a marriage ceremony is a statement which brings about the assent to marriage, i.e. it's a kind of ritual speech that performs the act of entering into marriage or formally recognizing such a marriage.
This is probably not what Judith Butler had in mind, but they are examples of what philosophers of language would call performative speech.