The article uses the term "feeling" here to discuss two very different concepts: B-Feelings: Behavioral feelings (BFs). This is an understanding of "feelings" as functional states in the brain....
The article uses the term "feeling" here to discuss two very different concepts:
B-Feelings: Behavioral feelings (BFs). This is an understanding of "feelings" as functional states in the brain. This is, in principle, entirely externally discoverable. An alien neuroscientist can know about my BFs far better than I ever could. This is because I know almost nothing about my brain's functional organization through introspection.
P-Feelings: Phenomenal feelings (PFs). This is an understanding of "feelings" as felt-experiences. This is the aspects of our experience that evade description such as the taste of mint, the smell of coffee, etc. I cannot tell my colorblind friend what the PF of seeing red is like. Nor can she discover it by examining my neurology. For the same reason, it's hard to say if we can ever know if some LLM experiences PFs.
If we somehow find a perfect mapping of BFs -> PFs by doing both neuroscience and asking people about their PFs, this data would be neutral on what some call "the hard problem of consciousness". It wouldn't tell us whether systems like LLMs that lack relevantly similar BFs to us are conscious. Nor why some BFs have associated PFs at all.
All philosophers of mind think there's an ideal mapping of BFs -> PFs[1] discoverable in principle. This won't help us make any progress at all on "the hard problem" (as the problem is currently understood.) If you want to know exactly why the problem is seemingly intractable or why BF -> PF mappings don't help, check out my comment here.
[1] Note that some think PFs either don't exist, or our reports about PFs are due to the way we form concepts about our experiences. They may reject BF -> PF mappings insofar as they reject that PFs refer to anything at all. In this case, understand the mappings as BF -> PF reports.
This is a general, pop science type overview of some of the things that are happening in the study of consciousness. Nothing too deep or academic, but I thought a pleasant enough read worth...
This is a general, pop science type overview of some of the things that are happening in the study of consciousness. Nothing too deep or academic, but I thought a pleasant enough read worth sharing nonetheless.
I've said it before, but my stance has always been that consciousness does not exist. In my view it's just a rationalist, or secular, continuance of the concept of a "soul" and in general it just...
I've said it before, but my stance has always been that consciousness does not exist.
In my view it's just a rationalist, or secular, continuance of the concept of a "soul" and in general it just does not exist.
The article uses the term "feeling" here to discuss two very different concepts:
B-Feelings: Behavioral feelings (BFs). This is an understanding of "feelings" as functional states in the brain. This is, in principle, entirely externally discoverable. An alien neuroscientist can know about my BFs far better than I ever could. This is because I know almost nothing about my brain's functional organization through introspection.
P-Feelings: Phenomenal feelings (PFs). This is an understanding of "feelings" as felt-experiences. This is the aspects of our experience that evade description such as the taste of mint, the smell of coffee, etc. I cannot tell my colorblind friend what the PF of seeing red is like. Nor can she discover it by examining my neurology. For the same reason, it's hard to say if we can ever know if some LLM experiences PFs.
If we somehow find a perfect mapping of BFs -> PFs by doing both neuroscience and asking people about their PFs, this data would be neutral on what some call "the hard problem of consciousness". It wouldn't tell us whether systems like LLMs that lack relevantly similar BFs to us are conscious. Nor why some BFs have associated PFs at all.
All philosophers of mind think there's an ideal mapping of BFs -> PFs[1] discoverable in principle. This won't help us make any progress at all on "the hard problem" (as the problem is currently understood.) If you want to know exactly why the problem is seemingly intractable or why BF -> PF mappings don't help, check out my comment here.
[1] Note that some think PFs either don't exist, or our reports about PFs are due to the way we form concepts about our experiences. They may reject BF -> PF mappings insofar as they reject that PFs refer to anything at all. In this case, understand the mappings as BF -> PF reports.
This is a general, pop science type overview of some of the things that are happening in the study of consciousness. Nothing too deep or academic, but I thought a pleasant enough read worth sharing nonetheless.
I've said it before, but my stance has always been that consciousness does not exist.
In my view it's just a rationalist, or secular, continuance of the concept of a "soul" and in general it just does not exist.